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BOOK VI

Chapter i

Is it the duty of good prince to destroy faults of republics by force of arms?

ERTAIN devout interpreters have expressed the opinion that all the precepts in this Book should be expunged. The reason is that these axioms for founding and preserving republics are extend to their faults and blemishes. It is impious, they say, to nurse and preserve the diseases of the body, and criminal to do so for the diseases and disorders of the commonwealth. I approve of their error and their benevolent disposition towards their nation, but inasmuch as these are times in which you may see tailed scorpions crawling for the from their hatched eggs, citizens are better forewarned, so that, protected in advance against their strike and their sting, they may shun them, rather than being allowed to perish, deceived by their ignorance of such great evils. Therefore if in this context anyone should ask why Aristotle lavishes such effort that the incorrect forms (or rather deformities) of republics are decked out in so many and such various colors, I reply as I did before, in this small Book he has depicted their wiles and snares no differently than a ship’s captain maps out shoals and reefs, since (as Versor says) the portraits and images of these transgressions are delineated by the Philosopher, not so they might be worshipped by princes, so that, having been erected by tyrants, they may be destroyed. Aristotle’s words are these: Indeed they can destroy them all the more willingly if they understand them, for in this manner they know how to elude and baffle their masters’ deceits. For, just as in the theoretic sciences errors are recited, not so men may fall into them, but rather that they learn how to avoid them, so in this description of the republic errors are set forth so that, understanding them, we may shun them. For it is no bad thing to understand that which is bad, but only to perpetrate it when we understand it. Therefore those who expound the Philosopher frankly, and who rightly perceive his idea in creating and preserving bad forms of republic, maintain that he did not waste his effort, particularly when he had this in mind, that by introducing bad forms he might make it more evident what the good ones are, and how they might better be preserved. I shall not repeat what Versor adds here, namely that there is one reason why Aristotle establishes tyranny, oligarchy, and popular madness so elaborately, since upon occasion these ways of governing are necessary. For although they be bad, the times and manners of men can be such that these are most expedient for a time, like the Roman dictatorship and the Athenian ephorate. For if citizens do not worship Jupiter, they are obliged to cultivate Mars. The frogs scorned King Log, so they were given a vulture. If men do not tolerate the olive of peace, they deserve to feel Mars’ sharp and stroppy spear.
2. But enough instruction has been given about these things previously. But now I would not have us imagine that Aristotle and Machiavelli have drunken the dregs from the same cup, and have not described these dregs of republics with the same intention, since the former discusses them as defects, the latter as forms; when the former describes those who rule in these as traitors to their nation, but the latter as good kings and politic governors. Here, Versor says, a doubtful question is not inopportunely raised, whether any prince may justly dissolve the faults of republics? For its solution he advances three ideas: the first is that in the commonwealth the prince is in a certain sense everything; the second is that by nature’s law the prince is under obligation to the First Being, which is God, whose personage he bears, before all other things; the third is that every transgression and fault of the republic is in despite of nature and the majesty of the First Being. Hence he concludes that it is the duty of every good prince to destroy and abolish these deformities of republics to the best of his ability. But since sovereignties are either subordinate (as they say) in position, such as a dukedom to kingship, or established over a region as two separate and distinct governments, the question is whether princes are bound to compel others by arms to embrace the laws of nature and the First Being they have themselves embraced. The interpretation of those placed in subordinate honors in the same commonwealth is unambiguous. For it is permitted superiors to compel their inferiors to their office with the sword. About those not placed in subordinate positions, this is the opinion of some interpreters, namely that it ought to be allowed any man administering the republic to invade by arms other men wholly opposed to natural, human and divine right. They add as their reason that any good king you choose to name is a viceroy of the First Prince and of universal nature. If, therefore, conspicuous deviations from these should occur, they are bound by their office to employ all their powers in correcting and reforming such men. For, they say, all princes are subject to God and nature, and as traitors against a king destroy the unity of his government, and for this are deserving of dire punishment, so kings who sin against God and nature violate harmony and consensus, and are rendered unworthy of the light, unworthy of their scepter and government. Furthermore, they say, if for the common good it is permissible to give aid against sovereigns to subjects oppressed by the intolerable yoke of tyrants, how much more their names deserve to be erased from the catalogue of kings, who with a kind of onslaught and disaffection rage against nature and against God. Each and every one of these devotees of Catiline is justly beheaded, since they sunder the union of the head, they are justly torn limb from lib since they sunder the union of citizens (who are the members of republics). But all princes are subject to God, and if they seditiously depart from Him, if they survive as men because of the scepter’s majesty, yet the unworthiness of their crime demands that their royal splendor should rust and tarnish. For who hopes that others will love him, when he himself holds the divine godhead in contempt?
3. Other men once said thee things. I am also writing them now, so we may understand that arms taken up against barbarians and infidels are not unjust. For, in addition to that divine oracle by which Israel was commanded to fight against the Canaanites, arguments are not wanting to advise us to employ steel and fire against the Mohammedans in this crazed time of the world. Now Christian walls are shaking. Oh good Christ, let them not fall! Hell Gate is open, and speaks stony things against the citadels and towers of Sion. They have their Koran, the Persians and Turks have their magic. Yea, in many parts of Europe they have trampled the express word of the faith. The gentiles have come, Lord, and polluted Your temple. They have condemned Your prophets to the sword, the cross, the stones. Rise up, I pray, and arouse Your Joshuas, Your Sampsons, Your Davids; that is, arouse all Christian kings, so they may recoil from the impious discords with which they rend each other, and with a single mind might fight against Your enemies. I pray these things (earnest reader), since I deem it a right just war which is waged on behalf of Christ, his sweet dove and pillar of truth. For Persian tyranny is a fault of the republic contrary to nature, but (as has been proven) kings are bound to invade with arms the enemies of nature and of God, and to correct and constrain the faults of the republic. So why are we standing idly? But you will say vengeance is to be left to God. This is true, but God rarely inflicts vengeance without employing a means. “What you are saying is perilous.” Why do? “Because arms are not to be taken up against princes, as you have taught before. This is also true. But the tyrant and God’s enemy does not merit the name of prince. “But you have previously denied that a tyrant is to be deposed by his subjects.“ I still deny this thing, if he has been made a prince by succession or election. Here, however, we are disputing about kingships not placed in a subordinate position, and it is permissible for other kings to expunge and uproot their faults against nature and the majesty of the First King. ”If this window is opened, the will (as they say) fall upon Christ’s sheepfold, and every trifling occasion for making tragic warfare will be seized upon. So tell me, what kingdoms, what kings do you have in mind? b Barbarians, certainly not Christians. For the former wholly oppose themselves to nature, religion, God, Christ, the Church, and all right divine and human whereas the latter, having and worshipping one and the same head, should not slaughter each other with arms. For they have received a new mandate, that they should love one another, not rend each other, since it is monstrous that the members of a single head, the parts of the same body, the inhabitants of one city, the sons of the same father, and brothers in Christ should break the bonds of peace, and tear at each other not otherwise than carnivorous, fierce lions. The Apostle has forbidden Christians strife and contentions, how much more earnestly did he wish to forbid the killings and fires of war? ”Is this what you say now? What if a Christian king should wholly forswear religion, faith, and the worship of God? What if Diagoras should become an infidel, a barbarian and a Mohammedan? What? Then let him beware lest he feel God’s most just thunderbolt, he who has most unjustly violated the covenant by which he is bound to God. Let him beware, I say, lest, when hze feloniously hates the divine godhead, he himself not unjustly squanders the title of king and the light of human honor.
4. I have spoken thus far about the reason why the incorrect forms and faults of commonwealths are introduced by Aristotle in this Book, now with a few words I should turn to a more detailed exposition of the text. First, this chapter has three parts, namely a repetition of what has gone before, an advertisement of the things which will be handled, and then an exposition of popular power, from which this Book takes its beginning. The repetition is so clear and obvious that he who would expend effort on explaining it should seem to be adding light to the sun. In his advertisement the Philosopher announces he is going to be speaking of the various forms of democracy and of their connections, which (if I may speak thus) being bent this way or that create different formulae for administering the republic. For example, if under a popular constitution the wealthy collaborate, then this constitution takes on the scheme and motion of oligarchy; if the powerful lord it in the courts, it likewise tends towards aristocracy. With this posited, he declares that there are two particular causes why there are many species of popular power: as he has said before, one is the dissimilarity of the multitude. For in a popular constitution there is one multitude of farmers, another of artisans, and yet a third of hirelings. If the first is joined to the second, you may see one species of democracy; but if the third is joined to the first two, then you may see another. Another causes why there are multiple species of this administration is a distinction of diverse properties, which begets diverse species of popular power: therefore, just as we must understand the parts of this form, so we should understand its properties. For under this constitution differing kinds and means of administration arise from the diverse distinction of its properties, just as from that of its parts. If someone should ask in this context why the Philosopher has treated of popular government first and so copiously in this Book, some respond that this is because in his time the multitude began to strive for a new means of government by the agency of tribunes; but others that in the construction of any republic magistrates should watchfully observe and foresee that the people be governed aright. For, since every commonwealth is a multitude, and every republic an ordering of the commonwealth, it is necessary that the people (of which both principally consist) be greatly valued and esteemed in both. But inasmuch as it is difficult to tame this many-headed hydra and soothe the unschooled multitude, it was the Philosopher’s task to speak first and capaciously about this species.

THE DISTINCTION OF THE QUESTION

5. OBJECTION It has been copiously disputed above about democracy and the power of the wealthy, therefore it is superfluous to devote an entire Book to them.
RESPONSE These kinds of administration are considered in two ways, either with respect to definition and division, and thus it has been sufficiently disputed above, or with respect of the establishment of a multiple and varied method of governing within them, which two things are handled in this Book with the intention that these plagues of republics, being understood, may be more readily destroyed.

OBJECTIONS TO THE QUESTION

6. OBJECTION Faults of republics are sometimes necessary in the commonwealth, such as tyrannical dictatorship in time of war, and a Persian and brief savagery during civil sedition, therefore it is not permissible to destroy them.
RESPONSE I deny that dictatorship in time of war and tyranny (if it occurs with popular consent) is tyranny or a fault of the republic. For, just as surgeons should not be deemed cruel if they employ steel to cut off rotten parts of the body with dispatch, so dictators who remove seditious citizens or deadly foemen are not to be considered tyrants.
OPPOSITION It is not permissible to open a window to the destruction of republics, but to expel by arms some men who rule contrary to nature and God is to open a window to the destruction of republics, therefore it is not permissible to attack by arms kings who rule contrary to nature and God. The minor premise is proven, since hornets, provoked by arms but not overcome, fly into a rage and turn their stings against their enemies. Add to this that it is most difficult to discern enemies of God and nature.
RESPONSE Here it is to be diligently observed that not any old things should provoke princes to fight against others, but when God’s cause is at stake, or when an intolerable injury against right and equity confronts us. Further more, we should not immediately resort to arms, but first to counsel and admonitions. For if they can be soothed with words, they should not be pressed with arms. For arms are extreme remedies, and indeed to press barbarians (who sin against nature and God) in this manner is not to throw open a window to the destruction of republics. For even if they should rage like provoked lions, yet when they are weakened they fear lest they should lose their life, as they lose their honor. I add this too, that it is not difficult to discern enemies of God an nature, as in this context I only name those as God’s enemies who with deadly hatred persecute Christ and all religion and piety.
OBJECTION Barbarians and monstrous tyrants are scourges of divine providence for the avenging of human crimes, therefore those who take up arms against them are fighting against divine providence.
RESPONSE God provoked Pharaoh, but He sent Moses as a leader and freed his people. Assuredly barbarians, Persians and Turks are God’s scourges, but since they fight against God and Christ, the duty of a king is to protect his head and raise arms against God’s enemies. For even if divine providence sometimes allows enemies of the Church, yet in its mind it abhors them and does not prescribe that we suffer their onslaught; nay, it teaches that we resist their wiles in every way. For even if tyrants are God’s scourges with respect to our sins, yet in that respect that they hate God and nature, they should be suppressed and checked like blasts of a gale.
OBJECTION Infidels should not be compelled to the faith, therefore we should not bear arms against them. The antecedent is proven, since God receives men who are willing, not coerced. The reasoning is clear, since arms are taken up against them most especially that they might accept the faith.
RESPONSE It is one thing to bear arms against them lest they harm the Church, but another to compel them to the faith lest they fall into Gehenna. I admit they should not be compelled to the faith, yet I say that it is in the interest of all men that they be driven off from Christ’s sheepfold. O would that Christian princes would at length be willing to remember this! Would, I say, that they not feed the fires of the greatest tragedies between themselves! Would that we would hear that gloomy poem no more, Alas, how great things perish for light causes! The soldiers of the Jews did not divide up Christ’s seamless garment as we divide it, and unless the Almighty’s hand protect Jerusalem, we are betrayed to Titus, Vespasian, barbarous Turks and tyrants.

Chapter ii

Should citizens in a democracy have greater liberty than in kingship and the power of the optimates?

OUBTFUL questions occur rather rarely in this Book, since nearly everything treated in it is familiar and self-evident, but since a few offer themselves, I shall touch on them in a few words, as above. Now, following the Philosopher step by step (as they say), I shall come to where he has brought us. So the Philosopher proposes two things in this second chapter, namely certain postulates or axioms, and the manners or institutions of popular power. The postulates are two, liberty and equality. The alteration of governing and being governed argues the former, the equal proportion of property and honors argues the latter. For the people wants to govern by turns, it wants every man to live as he pleases, it wants equality of property to be measured by number, not dignity, and thus it stakes a claim on its distribution, since in this constitution all contention is about liberty and equality of property. If the former is lacking, people fall into a rage; if the latter is defective, each and every man goes a-rioting. For men of the popular party seek the former as their end, the latter as their means of living. The manners or properties which suit democracy are ten, namely to have all men elected to magistracies out of a field of all men; to have everybody preside over everybody by turns; to parcel out magistracies by lot; to make a poor man, or at least not very rich, a magistrate; not to admit no man twice to any given magistracy (military ones excepted); to keep a man a magistrate for a brief period; for everybody to pass judgment about all things, or at lest the most important; for the public meeting to have power in all things, or at least in the greatest, and the magistrate in none, or at least the smallest; to accord a council the power of magistrates, but no pay; for all men to receive magistracies, judicial positions; if everybody cannot receive pay, at least magistrates and men participating in courts, public assemblies, and the council should; and to regard low birth, poverty, and working for hire as highly democratic. For oligarchy is defined by noble birth, wealth and discipline. Here certain commentators add other properties, namely that a magistracy should not be perpetual, and his creation should be transferred from election to lot, but I regard these as a repetition of the two preceding rather than as a demonstration of new ones.
2. And so, returning to the first proposition, I raise this question, whether citizens in a democracy have greater liberty than in kingship or the power of the optimates? “Why should they not have it,” you will perhaps say, “especially since the people strives for liberty as its summum bonum, when it should be permissible under this constitution for every man to live entirely as his pleases, when it bids all things to be reduced and recalled to an equality of property and dignities? But in kingship and aristocracy magistrates are severe, laws severe, there is no license of living, no equalization of property, dignities, or persons. So there is not so great a liberty in kingship and the power of the optimates as in the popular constitution we are now discussing.” All that you say seems true, but is not. For if you define liberty truly, you will find a greater liberty in kingship and the power of the optimates than in democracy. I therefore make a distinction about this word “liberty”, as it pertains either to the disposition and decision of the will, or to the habitude and judgment of reasons. It is commonly defined as a faculty by which each man may live as he will according to his disposition. But in kingship and the power of the optimates, which are referred to the perfected good, there is present the liberty of the mind according to intellect and reason, but in democracy the liberty which is according to disposition. There is therefore a greater liberty in kingship and the power of the optimates than in democracy. For the latter is defined as license rather than liberty, but the latter, which is is defined according to reason’s judgment, is the only one that deserves to be called true liberty, since those men are slaves who are held in thralldom to their dispositions. For only good men are free, even if they are slaves. Hence Cicero put it excellently in one of his paradoxes. Liberty is the power of living as you will. He, however, lives as he wants who follows the right, who heeds his duty, whose way of living is considered and provident, he who does not obey even the laws out of fear, but follows and cultivates them, he who does nothing, thinks nothing, but willingly and freely. If, therefore, true and genuine liberty does not consist in living according to sense and appetite (for so the beasts live), but according to mind and wisdom, as Aristotle teaches in the Ethics, who does not see that citizens in kingship and power of the optimates have a greater liberty than within the popular constitution? So let democrats boast of their liberty as long as they want, let Marius and Sulla sophistically say, Beware, fellow citizens, beware, friends, for the consuls are depriving you of your liberty. Assuredly this is not the liberty to command what they will, but license, as Horace excellently sang: By taming your eager spirit you may reign more widely than if you joined Libya to remote Gades, and the Carthaginians on either side of the strait served you alone, since under the name of liberty they are not seeking freedom in their living, but frightfulness in their ruling. So when nobles vend liberty to the people in kingship or aristocracy, it is to be feared lest the republic witness the comet heralding its demise. For liberty exists when virtue rules, but the yoke of servitude when dispositions hold sway. We observe virtue ruling in monarchy and aristocracy, but disposition holding sway in democracy. I therefore conclude that there is a greater liberty of the people in these constitutions than in democracy.

THE DISTINCTION OF THE QUESTION

 

3. OBJECTION The first condition, namely that all men be elected to magistracies out of a field of all men, is not popular, therefore it is incorrect. The antecedent is proven, since, should this occur, there will be chaos, not an order of the commonwealth. For what begets greater confusion than to have Gryllus, born to the hoe more than the scepter, sitting in the benches of dignity? But according to this condition it is required that the dregs of the people, stupider than Gryllus, should consult, judge, and govern.
RESPONSE Even though the first condition may require that in this constitution all men be elected to magistracies out of a field of all men, yet the eighth demands that the public assembly hold sway in everything, or at least the greatest things, but the magistrate in none, or at least the smallest. So although according to the first a certain liberty is conceded to all men, yet in the eighth it is curbed for order’s sake.
OBJECTION The third condition, which demands that in this constitution magistracies be distributed by lot, is not popular, therefore it is wrongly introduced. The antecedent is clear, since where there is the greatest prudence, there is the least chance, the greatest prudence is in the popular constitution, therefore there is the least chance in the popular constitution, and in consequence the keys of the republic should not be handed out by lots. The major premise is Aristotle’s in Book VI of the Ethics and Book II of the Physics, for lot and chance do not govern the wise. The minor is likewise Aristotle’s, in Book III of the Politics, where he proves that the united people are stronger in intelligence, counsel and prudence than any single man among them all.
RESPONSE Although it is most democratic that each and every man in this constitution should entertain the hope of governing, consulting, and judging, yet for the sake of avoiding chaos it is necessary that magistrates be created in it by lot. Furthermore, I deny that the greatest prudence exists in this constitution, and as for that passage taken from the Politics, I say that here Aristotle alleged this confusedly, not definitively, while debating the issue back and forth.

OBJECTIONS TO THE QUESTION

4. OBJECTION In democracy, it is permissible for each man to live as he will, therefore in it there is greater liberty of the people than in kingship or the power of the optimates, in which the people is curbed by severe laws. The antecedent is Aristotle’s in the text. The reasoning follows from the definition of liberty.
RESPONSE True liberty does not consist of each man living as he will, but in directing his life as reason and order command, and in kingship and the power of the optimates citizens live according to the dictate of order and reason. In kingship and the power of the optimates citizens possess a greater liberty than in democracy.
OBJECTION It is not a free thing to be bound and constrained by laws, but in kingship and the power of the optimates the citizen is bound and constrained by laws, therefore the citizen is not free in kingship and the power of the optimates. The major premise is agreed, since what is owed and compelled is not free. The minor is proven, since in kingship and the power of the optimates it is by the laws’ will, voice and government that we are compelled.
RESPONSE Those who live according to reason and virtue obey voluntarily, and for them it is a free thing thus to serve. For to obey justice and equity is not servitude but liberty, since there is no burden, but rather honor, in embracing virtue. It is therefore a free thing to be bound by good and honest laws, it is a free thing to follow their will, voice and government. But that in kingship and aristocracy many are dragged to the gallows, the sword, the rack, this occurs because evil and felonious men exist, and desert and abandon human life, which is situated in the triumph of reason.

Chapter iii

When citizens are equally divided in the senate, is it expedient to decide great issues by lots?

N Aristotle, there are two parts to this chapter, a question and its solution. The question is how is it going to come to pass that justice maintains itself with equality both for the rich and the poor (out of which every commonwealth is composed) within the popular constitution. This doubtful point arises, since a little earlier the just arithmetic of the distribution of property and honors has been disputed. Some think that in this context the Philosopher has proposed two things in this question, viz., whether equality in democracy is to be understood in terms of the quantity of estates, or of the number and multitude of persons. That is, whether in the distribution of the cities offices such a proportion is to be observed that there are fifty wealthy men who have the same amount of property and resources as a thousand paupers, so that these and those would have an equal share in the common goods. With this doubtful points set forth, he asks which republic understood in this way is the most just in accordance with popular right, one that looks to the number of persons, or one that has regard for the abundance and power of property. The answer to this is that the popular party will accept one definition of justice, but the powerful another. For men of the popular faction will say that that is just and fair which seems such to the greater number, but those who are aiming at oligarchy, i. e. the well-to-do, will maintain that only that is just which gains the approval of the wealthier and more powerful. Aristotle refutes both opinions and shows that great difficulties follow from either. For if justice is understood as the prosperous would wish, tyranny and oppression ensue; but if as the paupers hope, there follows the ruin and insult of the wealthy. For the great and the powerful trample the humble multitude underfoot like flies, For both many powerful men and the multitude of the poor, formed, as it were, into a swarm, sometimes buzz, debarring and expelling the drones from the cells. So what is to be done? What to be defined? For, since it befalls every commonwealth to be composed of the well-to-do and the poor, it appears doubtful to what calculus this popular justice we are now discussing should be referred.
2. In the second part of this chapter there follows a full and clear solution, namely that in a democracy that should be accepted and adopted which appears just and equal to the majority. I say “the majority,” so that rich and poor may be conjoined, if in consultations about affairs both parties think the same thing. For example, if there are thirty rich and poor men who possess the power of deliberation or judgment, if twenty agree on the matter placed in question, their unanimous opinion should be taken for a firm and standing decree. But if in a public assembly or convened senate there is an even and equal number and division of votes or ballots, no easier or more expedient way exists of settling a dispute than to put an end to the whole business and controversy under dispute by lots. Hence (as I have proposed) arises a question, namely whether, should citizens be in disagreement in the senate with an equal number on both sides, it is expedient to determine great issues by lot. These are the words of the Philosopher: If at session of a public assembly or of judges, the opinions on either side should be equal, either the thing is to be entrusted to lot, or something similar is to be done. I have denied above that in correct forms of administering the republic anything is to be committed to the rashness of chance, unless a great necessity and occasion of affairs should present itself. But it sometimes happens that human deliberation, as it were, becomes irresolute at a crossroads, and it becomes so hesitant and doubtful that it will go entirely astray if it is not supported by some means wholly beyond the scope of reason. Therefore, lest the ship of the republic be endangered by such a struggle of contrary gales, lest citizens be cast into so great a distraction of mind, wise men sometimes invite Fortune into the senate, and appoint her a partner, and, as it were, manager of their counsels. But this should only occur when reason fails, it should only prevail when consultation grows faint. Therefore it was not unadvised that the Romans placed together a seeing Janus and blind Fortune in their temple the Pantheon, so that when the two-faced god could not see behind him, Fortune would cast her die. Place before your eyes a public assembly dealing with the election of a king, the waging of a war, or any other thing of great and important weight: they come to a vote, the house is divided, its members are polled and discovered to be equal, everybody is allowed to change his vote, every man declines to do so. What, pray, is to be done in this calamity of the republic? What will be decided? The wealthy and powerful will think unworthy aspersions have been cast upon them if they go away in defeat, the people will imagine all liberty to be taken away from itself if it retires, overwhelmed by violence, and is obliged to overlook the injury. Stubbornness exists on both sides, so there is no more wholesome scheme for removing the discord than to determine the issue by the casting of lots. But you will say that in such a great descent the matter will devolve upon the king. But what if the king be absent? “Then to a magistrate, who wears the personage of a king.” But such a magistrate does not always exist. “It does not matter whether this be one or many, let the contention be referred to him or to them.” You are scarce wise, for if sentence is passed against the wealthy, sedition will fly abroad; but if against the poor, they shall cry out oppression. But if the matter is settled by lot, there will be nobody so jealous as not to yield, nobody so imprudent as not to hold his peace. For it is impious and foolish to resist the hidden outcomes of things, which cannot be avoided.
3. So, although we should to the best of our ability take precautions lest deadlocks of this kind occur, which render counsel rash or nullify it altogether, yet when they have arisen no way can be determined safer than this one. Furthermore, when counsel fails and business is conducted by lots there is no suspicion of fraud, no fear of deceits, no corruption, all of which are present if the matter is consigned to the decision of a single man, or if senators are allowed to change their votes. Many men, and these not negligible gentlemen, are of the opinion that the counsels of the wise are brought to these passes not without the intervention of divine providence and impulse, so that they are obliged to admit that, just as they recognize the First Cause present in the most arcane causes of many things, so they see the same miraculous power operating by means of these lots that are beyond human understanding. Therefore if human wits suffer a dizziness in taking counsel, if people and prince, if each and every man philosophizing over great and doubtful affairs are, as it were, stuck in birdlime, if they must hasten rightwards or leftwards, if one or the other thing is to be done, of necessity we must think that an auspice of the good is concealed in the lot, that providence for the future is hidden in fortune. The Apostles deliberated whom they should substitute in the place of Judas the traitor, and at the time there were many grave, holy and religious men who occupied the episcopacy, but Matthew came into the number of the Apostles and the company of the Saints by lot rather than a synod, and that not without divine providence. Indeed I believe that those lots which the soldiers cast for our Savior’s seamless garment did not, in some manner, lack divine inspiration. For although they miserably rent the immaculate body of the Lamb with the lance, the scourge, the nail, they left undivided His garment, by which we allegorically understand the unity of the faith of the holy Church. I write this not so that great things will be committed to lots in public assembly if they can be settled by voice and reason, but so that Fortune may speak then, when human prudence is quite blinded. Here can be cited many examples of many races and commonwealths, many things said of lots by our ancestors and of places. It perhaps seems ridiculous that the most puissant emperor Darius gained the scepter because of a horse’s whinny, yet this is what Justin writes. Among the Macedonians it was not novel and strange to settle great affairs by casting dice. Modern days testify that the Venetians elect their doges and magistrates by lots, and settle serious quarrels and controversies in this manner. Therefore it is not wholly absurd, it is not altogether foreign to reason, if some things are sometimes entrusted to Fortune’s dice. For in Fortune’s spinning wheel is often Man’s guidance, not his mockery. Sometimes there is there is peace and stability, not always the commonwealth’s downfall, since Fortune gave Athens not only the owl and the grasshopper, but also the bee and the ant.

THE DISTINCTION OF THE QUESTION

 

AN OBJECTION TO THE FIRST PART OF THE CHAPTER

4. OBJECTION The same sharing of property and honors fathers confusion, therefore it is not to be tolerated under any constitution of the republic. The antecedent is proven, since if there is no distinction regarding the goods of fortune there will be no ordering of the commonwealth, no discrimination between Socrates and Gryllus, that is, between the wise man and the fool.
RESPONSE Some men say that democracy is a fault of the republic and that a confusion of things and persons exists within it. But it is better answered that participation in property and honors should be equal in potential, not actuality, and that not even Gryllus should be deprived of his share in this constitution. But, as has been demonstrated above, the public assembly possesses sovereignty in the greatest matters, but magistracy in the least.

OBJECTIONS TO THE QUESTION

5. OBJECTION The use of the lot has been discussed previously, therefore this repetition of the same thing is otiose.
RESPONSE I have previously denied that the magistrate should be elected by lot in a correct form of the republic, if that can fitly be done by reason. But here I am dealing with another constitution of administration, in which lots are occasionally necessary. Therefore the present disputation is not otiose, since a new occasion for its discussion is presented.
OBJECTION In the wrangling of the people (if matters of great moment are decided by lot) it is possible that by an impulse of rashness the commonwealth may go from Scylla to Charybdis, that is, from bad to worse. Therefore nothing ought to be relegated and entrusted to lot. The antecedent is proven, since, if the multitude is equally divided in its vote and lots should favor the seditious, it is necessary that the republic should witness its burial and, as it were, its corpse. And Fortune’s balls and, as it were, her tricks more frequently favor the bad than the good, the factious and the criminal then men zealous for virtue. It therefore follows that it is unsafe to decide the greatest affairs of the commonwealth by lots.
RESPONSE This argument urges that lots are to be used very rarely in the commonwealth. Yet it does not wholly abolish their employment, for what is said in this context to occur by lot, can also come to pass by the ballot, if the throng of bad men should prevail in voting. Thus, just as voting is not to be abolished because it occasionally harms the commonwealth, so lots are not to be banned because they sometimes fall to the felonious.
OBJECTION Neither antiquity, the authority of our ancestors, nor the contemporary habit of places confirms the use of lots, therefore it should not be allowed. The antecedent is proven since, as Herodotus writes, wisely-governed commonwealths abhor nothing more than to entrust anything to Fortune and the lot.
RESPONSE Herodotus likewise writes that the Athenians valued Musaeus’ prophecies so greatly that they banished Onomacritus, who was caught tampering with their text. , who does not know that Homer’s prophecies were held in such honor that poets permitted to sing them were thought to prophecize, not to be lying? Above I have touched on the Macedonians, the Venetians, and other commonwealths which are quite sound and ancient evidence regarding this thing. Therefore Herodotus’ dictum is to be understood in this way, namely that wisely-governed commonwealths should abhor nothing more to than entrust anything to Fortune and the lot, if it can otherwise be concluded and decided by the rule of reason.

Chapter iv

Are farmers to be preferred to shepherds and men who toil for money in a democracy?

ATO and Columella (whose authority nobody has yet disparaged as outlandish) have extolled the pursuit and art of farming with such great encomiums that you don’t know (if you don’t play very close attention) whether it is better to labor with the hoe along with Fabricius the senator or to join Hortensius in pleading civil causes in the courts with Attic eloquence. Those who philosophize in the theater stake a claim on honor, and I do not begrudge them. But those who toil in the field feed this honor, and I think that something is to be conceded them. When a rooster digs in a dunghill he comes across a gem. The jeweler who receives this precious thing is in ingrate if he does not give the rooster grain. The farmer, the shepherd, the merchant, who desire to till the land, graze the flock, enhance their wares, are compared by Aristotle here in such a way that, if you consider the popular method of governing and constitution, the farmer is preferred by far to the shepherd and the merchant. But, you will ask, what has it to do with the republic for me to treat of the plant, of the flock, of merchants’ trinkets? It is indeed of great importance to the republic to understand the usefulness of these things. For if it neglect the plow, grain will fail it; if the sheep, wool; if merchants’ trinkets (as you call them), ornament and splendor. For from agriculture we gain the manifold fruit of the land; the boundless use of cattle and sheep from the pastoral art; knowledge and advantage of foreign nations, articles and manners from trade. Thus these three things are indeed necessary in the commonwealth, for upon it they confer food, clothing and ornamentation. But since there is a greater necessity in life and sustenance than in dress, and in dress a greater usefulness than in ornamentation, here with excellent right Aristotle places agriculture, which supplies life and sustenance, ahead of the pastoral and mercenary arts. As I begin to treat of these three things I shall not now resort to histories and reports of times and truths, for I were to do so my profuse discourse would grow into a volume and would find no measure of praise, since as witness to the honor in value in which these three were once held we have Thebes, which farmers magnificently erected, Rome, founded by shepherds, Athens, built by merchants. Adam and the Patriarchs tilled the land, Moses and David pastured the flock, God invented the ark and the ship.
2. But I shall address the arguments and reasonings of the comparison, and show that farmers are far fitter for the administration of the people or democracy than are shepherds and merchants. Since this constitution (I mean the popular one) for the most part grew together out of the plebeian multitude, and when it came near to being a polity (in which the people held sway for the sake of the public and common good), and since the mass of men are more vigorous in their senses than in their mind and are attracted to external objects more than internal ones, it was necessary (in the absence of any mind equipped with leisure for contemplation) that the mass of citizens be busily engaged in those tasks in which the express and visible species and form of virtue could be discerned. And in farming there are many, as it were, perceptible virtues, such as physical exercise, humility, limited appetite for wealth, scorn for honors, simplicity of mind, frugality of living, and a wonderful parsimony and moderation in diet, all of which recommend the farmer, so that the rustic seems more blessed in his small hut than Alexander in his great empire. For princes clad in purple, glutted with banquets, devoted to leisure, build, as it were, the nests of the vices, and sleeping away to the sounds of the Sirens, perish without any banneret of honor. But farmers, protected from the cold only by their cloaks, fed with rougher fare, exhausted by their labors, ward off the drones from the cells, hold Helen in contempt, give no ear to Circe’s incantations, and live sober, unfamiliar with fraud and deceit. Amazing, therefore, is the providence of God, which has so disposed commonwealths that Corydon and Thryses, bent upon their work, fly up to heaven from the dunghill and the flock. Hence the proverb, relentless toil keeps the body sound and the mind sane. Therefore those are less vigorous in mind and wit should sweat along with the farmers, lest, while their senses are glutted by leisure, their mental powers become corrupted by vice. Back when the Church was being reborn the Fathers decreed that friars and monks, exhausted by study, should till and labor in the vineyards, but they did so not only that these men might find refreshment, but also that they would avoid leisure, the tinder and bait of the vices.
3. But I return to Aristotle. Farmers, he says, are fitter for governing democracy, first because they are for the most part honest and earnest men; then because nearly each and every one of them has no experience with fraud; next because they are foreigners to avarice; finally because least of all men do they strive after ambition and sedition. It is evident that they are earnest men, for, as I have shown above, they free their minds from the tyranny and yoke of the vices. For these men do not corrupt their eyes with statues of Venus, nor their taste with Bacchus’ banquets, nor their touch with the menstrual blood of sluts, nor their hearing with Paris’ ditties, nor their nose with pleasure’s foamy little vapors. They live content if they possess turf, a hearth, a slave and a cow; they aspire to nothing above their lot; with a dog and a goose keeping guard at the door they sleep soundly; they arise in the morning, give praise to God, and go back to their chores. What else is this than to live honestly and earnestly? But that this kind of men are unacquainted with fraud and not at all shrewd is agreed because of this, that it is not torpid with leisure and it does without companionship. For shrewdness flows from leisure and bad companionship, since fraud requires study, deceits require canny counsel. But farmers, wounded by the tedium of their labors, do not have the leisure to pursue devices, do not have the counsel to pursue schemes. Furthermore, farmers are not sordidly avaricious and greedy wastrels of property. The Philosopher adds reasons in the text, first that they employ only natural riches, concerning which neither can their appetite be much deceived, nor can their limited appetite be limitlessly overcome, and second because their condition and slender state is supported by less. Hence it often comes about that, a form of administration having been changed, farmers cheerfully tolerate the power of the prosperous as long as they are allowed to enjoy their private possessions and goods (humble as these may be), which would assuredly not be the case if their appetite was not thoroughly appeased by the necessities they have acquired. Finally, farmers are very rarely if ever aglow, kindled by the torches of ambition and the flames of sedition. For they are fixed on the fertile soil, not the regal scepter, the fecundity of the land, not the majesty of empire. Thus, albeit every man is hungry for glory and honor, so that farmers are sometimes tickled with a desire for dignity’s badges, yet their thirst can be more readily sated and quenched if they are admitted to the counsels, judgments and decisions of the commonwealth, if they may enjoy what is their own, if they possess only a middling liberty.
4. It is therefore politic and even necessary in the commonwealth to place no small value on both farming and farmers, indeed sometimes to entice men to this pursuit by honorable rewards. As he tilled his field, it was announced to Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus that he had been created dictator. Curius was summoned from cottage to senate, and so was many another old man, as Cicero says. What should I add? Nothing is more pleasant, nothing more useful, nothing more delightful than the farmers’ art, which (as Plato says) consists of the variety of natural things, usefulness, and fertility. But read more about this matter in Cicero, Xenophon and Politian, let these things suffice for now, from which it is manifest that the best species of popular power is that made up of farmers and farming. For, if I may summarize, farmers are not slothful with leisure; they do not abound in property; they are not ambitious honor-seeker; they do not practice deceits; they are rarely if ever seditious, malevolent, or sly; they are physically fit for waging war; they do not snatch at other men’s possessions; they live content with very little; they do not strive to pill, poll and drain dry wallets, fortunes, or the public treasury; and lastly for its nourishment and preservation they provide the commonwealth immeasurable fruits won from the earth’s womb by their own labor. But shepherds and merchants do nothing of the kind. Therefore in a political democracy farmers are to be preferred to these by many a degree.
5. Now approach Romulus and Remus, those noblest shepherds of them all and the founders of Rome. But what am I to say about the pastoral life? Are shepherds with their fields and flocks to come into the senate? Tityrus and Meleboeus live at Mantua, not Rome, shepherds ought to dwell in dale, mountain and forest with their sheep, rather than in a public assembly with their fellow citizens. But I am playing with words, so I shall reduce the matter to a point. Here shepherds are understood not only as those who graze flocks, but also for those who make their living from pasturage. For their life three things are requisite, the solitary life, industry of mind, and strength or fortitude of body: the solitary life, so they may attend to the flock; industry of mind so they may find pastures and fodder and cure the diseases of their sheep; strength of body, so that they may not only defend the flock from wild beasts, but also that themselves may withstand every gust of wind and storm. Hence it is concluded that the pastoral life is not political, properly and simply, since it is solitary, and solitude is in a sense opposed to the light and throng of mankind which is properly called the commonwealth. Furthermore, to dwell and live constantly with beasts produces manners foreign to the commonwealth. For, just as excessive familiarity with sluts makes men whoremongers and effeminate, so it is strange if those who live for years with brute animals do not become somewhat boorish and crude. The pastoral life is therefore very risky for ill-educated men, who the Philosopher has already very rightly debarred from all of life’s fellowship. For, in the manner that good men often lead the hermetic life so that in this moment of mortality they may more sightfully contemplate the Godhead’s eternal and infinite circumference, so the wicked and the dissolute often profess the solitary life so that they might descend all the more headlong into the mire of their crimes and the maw of Hell. These are the ones who squander the immeasurable reward and jewel of virtue in exchange for a brief moment of pleasure, heaven for earth, Christ for a feather. A feather for Christ, I say, since they slumber sound and supine in this vale, those whose life is a death, whose death is the entombment of their life. Yet I am not denying here that many shepherds who, keeping watch in the small of the night, see angels, hear and sing Glory be to God on high, who, I say, thrice love Christ while pasturing their sheep, and following in His footsteps bequeath their flock excellent examples of sanctity. But why say these things? Is the pastoral life to be called speculative rather than political and civil? Yes indeed, for it is solitary, and far removed and foreign from the hubbub of the commonwealth. Enoch, Abel, and David poured forth heartfelt prayers to God while they pastured their flocks among the thornbrakes. Therefore, if the mind be not too dull, the life of shepherds is not abject. But if it is compared with the work and art of farmers, it is less civil and less useful for the necessities of the commonwealth.
6. It now remains for me to compare merchants and men who work for pay with the condition of farmers and shepherds, for this is the final part of my comparison. Nature has always been the mother of merchants, experience their wet-nurse. For since all things do not abound in every place and clime of the world, so that many useful and many necessary things are lacking, merchants were created so that whatever is not at hand at home might be fetched by them from places where they are more copiously available. The ship is the merchant’s vehicle, his hand the right one, money his reputation, the exchange of goods his aim. In every republic merchants are established lest commonwealths weaken or fail for the lack of necessary and useful things. Hence our forefathers granted merchants many liberties and privileges: for example a common market, a harbor, a church, the protection of justice, and in many places even the freedom to vote, not otherwise than if they were citizens by birth or naturalization. As Sepulveda specified, a merchant should be kempt, just, patient in suffering, learned in languages, manners and places, diligent in his profit-making, lavish in his expenditure. Physical adornment is requisite, so that he be likable; wealth, since as much money as a man keeps in his chest, so much credit has he; justice, so he may preserve his good name and credit; patience in enduring hardships, so that he may withstand storms of sea and air; knowledge of languages, manners and customs, so he may manage his own business and affairs; diligence in profit-making, so he may increase his estate; liberality in expenditure, so he may gain the people’s favor. Such merchants are bulwarks of the commonwealth and (if I may say so) the physicians and remedies of defects in the commonwealth, since they carefully think upon what is lacking, what scarcity is going to occur. Having taken counsel, they fly through sea, land and fire to the Indies, they load their ships, they return through shoals, they shun no risk to life and fortune as long as they bless their commonwealths with an abundance of things in short supply. Tyre and Sidon are lauded in Holy Scripture for their merchants, they were blessed merchants indeed who fetched from abroad many precious things for the building of Solomon’s temple. Joseph, if I may say so, was a fine commodity, whom merchants once bought from his brothers and carried into Egypt and to the house of Pharaoh. They are not to be scorned who have brought, together with their wares, the jewel of the sacred Word to Indians, cannibals, and wild barbarians. Those who purchase such wares have their reward in heaven.
7. So much for the condition and title of merchants, now we deal with the comparison of them with farmers and shepherds within democracy. Here the distinction must be made that the life of merchants is to be considered in two ways, either strictly according to its origin and introduction, or generally and commonly according to the passage of time and human corruption. In the first way, their life is just to all men, useful to themselves, and necessary for the republic: just to all men, because it harms nobody; useful to themselves, because it is devoted to profit and gain; necessary for the republic, since it relieves and succors its want. Taken in the second way, it is often harmful, for it is rapacious and capable of all things. Add to this, if you will, that it is lying and deceitful: rapacious, because in merchants the appetite for money is insatiable, according to that line, As one’s money grows, so does his love of money; capable, because of all things they most adore and worship Plutus the wealth-god; lying, since nearly each and every merchant dares perjure himself in pushing his wares, let alone (begging these gentlemen’s pardon) lie, feign and dissimulate. Speaking of these men, the Philosopher says they are worse than farmers and shepherds, both because their pursuits and works have nothing in common with virtue, and since, being avaricious, deceitful and ambitious, they are readily drawn to sedition, evils which occur with greater difficulty as they are powerful and wealthy, and are daily involved in the market and the theater. Here it is to be remarked that in this chapter by this word “merchant” artisans and hirelings are to be understood generally, but properly (as I have said above) merchants are the ones who furnish aid for deficiencies with their ship, their wares and their art, and remove every shortage.
8. If you wish to learn here in a few words and in their due order what is said by Aristotle in this chapter, this is their gist. First he proves that popular administration is best which consists of farmers. He supplies reasons, since farmers, concerned only with necessities for their daily bread, undertake nothing against the republic; since, engaged in their own efforts, they do not furiously grasp at other men’s property; that they take more delight in their work in countryside than they tolerate the light of the commonwealth; that they do not seek magistracies, or, if they do, their thirst is easily quenched and satisfied, at least if the power of creating and correcting magistrates is allowed them. There it is to be ordained that in this form of the republic the people should elect magistrates; that it should have fixed and determined possessions; that it should not sell away its heritage; that it should not grow infinitely rich; that it should live according to the laws and institutions of its ancestors. After the farmers, in this kind of government the shepherds have a claim on second place. For they have a great kinship with farmers, since they dwell in the fields and, being sturdy of frame, are fit, useful and suited for war. But they are deemed less political to the degree that they require a more solitary life than do farmers. Then he shows that the crew of merchants, workmen and hirelings form the worst species of popular government. His reason follows in the text, that it is idle, avaricious, and readily incited to every movement of sedition. Lastly, the Philosopher gives three rules for the preservation of this administration. The first is that it should be permissible for no man to possess an income over a fixed and definite proportion, the second that it should be allowed no man to sell of the primary capital of an inheritance, and the third is that it should be allowed no man to put his hereditary right in pawn.

THE DISTINCTION OF THE QUESTION

 

9. OBJECTION Always dwelling in the countryside, farmers become boorish and crude, therefore they are in no wise fit for the republic. The antecedent is agreed, since rustic habit turns into nature. The argument holds, since only those men are fit for participation in the republic who thrive in the ornamentation of their manners, the cultivation of their wit, the government of their reason.
RESPONSE Farmers are understood either as nature’s chattel, and as such they are unsuitable for participation in the republic, or as heads of household busily occupied in the countryside, and as men well-versed in rustic affairs, and as such they are by far preferable to shepherds and hirelings with respect to governing the popular power, which we are now dealing. In this context, therefore, it is to be observed that the first place is not to be accorded farmers with respect to all things. For thus they would be better men than consuls, than senators, than sages. But this comparison is only between farmers, shepherds and merchants, in which comparison they are rightfully preferred to the others for the aforesaid reasons.
OBJECTION The theoretic or contemplative life is better than the political or active one, the life of shepherds is more theoretic and contemplative than that of farmers, therefore the shepherds’ life is better. The major premise is Aristotle’s in Book X of the Ethics. The minor is in the text.
RESPONSE We are not speaking here about the perfection of life with respect to moral virtue or the mind, but with respect to the commonwealth and action. More profits and conveniences are supplied the republic by farmers (who are always working) than by shepherds (who often live at leisure). The theoretic life is indeed better if you consider the man, but the political one is better if you consider the commonwealth.
OBJECTION For the republic’s sake, merchants are engaged in more honorable work, and in more fearful danger, therefore they are to be preferred to farmers. The antecedent is clear, since the merchant’s task is to enter into contracts with foreign nations, to learn their manners, customs and laws, to make good the commonwealth’s shortages, to steer between shoals, all of which are much more illustrious than to dig at a dunghill, plow the land, or do any rustics’ jobs.
RESPONSE You are in jest, for here we should consider the necessity of a task and action, not its dignity. We may perhaps admit that there is greater splendor and ornament in the merchants’ life, but I wholly deny that a greater usefulness and profit for the public comes from them, for nearly all the stuff that merchants buy is superfluous, whereas everything that farmers provide is necessary. If perfumes, gems or cloth of gold are wanting, the republic survives; but without grain, wool and food the commonwealth perishes.
OBJECTION It is undeniable that merchants possess greater prudence and experience in governing than do farmers, therefore they are to be more valued in the administration of the republic. The antecedent is clear in the text, where it is taught that merchants live in the light of the commonwealth; that they attend public assemblies and councils; that they understand the succession and alteration of the most important things; that they learn to their fingertips the manners of their fellow-citizens and the powers of the laws. But farmers in the countryside, sitting on turf and in their poor abodes, see and hear none of these things.
10. RESPONSE These considerations would gave great weight if we were dealing here with another constitution and form of the republic, but in a democracy, in which the people holds sway, all these things are not strictly requisite. Furthermore, since when merchants have become prosperous they are wont to aim at oligarchy more than popular liberty, it is to be feared lest their experience work more harm for changing the constitution of the commonwealth than the middling industry of farmers is advantageous for its preservation. In a popular power, therefore, it suffices to have popular knowledge and experience of affairs, or at least to yield the keys of the commonwealth to men with savoir faire and experience in such a way that it is allowed to bridle them in accordance with the will of the people or the multitude.
OBJECTION In this chapter the Philosopher sets forth many things absurdly, therefore it is ill defended in this context. The antecedent is proven, since he urges that under this constitution it will be well advised for each man to live as he will. Again, he says that in this kind of government it is safe to bestow citizenship on bastards, dangerous men and foreigners. Then too, he affirms that it allowable for the multitude to continue deceiving with sophistries and tricks until it overcomes the nobles and men of the middling sort. Why add more? Here he appears to give his approval to the license of slaves, the softness of boys, the common ownership of women, and a more than barbaric confusion of divine and human things, all of which items are manifestly obvious to readers.
RESPONSE This controversy is ended with a single word, if I say that what is set forth in each of these places is disputed about the final species of popular power, which needs to be preserved by these arts. It is inexpressibly the worst form, to be be preserved by the worst of methods, since it comes together from the offscourings of the multitude, and takes to its bosom and senate as citizens bastards, oath-breakers, barbarians, the unclean, and butchers guilty of every manner of felony. I therefore admit that Aristotle says all this, yet in such a way that all of these things are referred to the tyrannical and raging lunacy of the people, not to the genuine power of the people. Therefore, just as in previously dealing with tyranny he laid bare its crimes of times, places and men, so, speaking now of popular madness, under the pretext of its preservation he uncovers and describes the contagious plagues of this fault of the commonwealth. But he teaches, as is very clear, in other forms of popular administration these monstrosities of evil are to be avoided.

THE CHAPTER’S DOUBTFUL QUESTION
Are the common people to be inspired to the pursuit of agriculture?

11. In this chapter three laws devised for preserving the power of the people are established by the Philosopher. Of these the the first is that each man should possess a fixed and defined measure of land, the second that nobody should sell off the primary capital of an inheritance, and the third that nobody should put in pawn his hereditary right or use it as collateral on a loan. The first and the second were set forth by Plato, the third by the Thracian Oxylus, lawmaker of the citizens of Aphytis. In the first equality is sought, liberty in the second, the honor and amplitude of the commonwealth in the third. For citizens are equals when each one possesses a fixed measure, free when a man owns something in his own right, and honorable when they do not harm themselves either with interest nor loans. But here were are dealing only with the first law, which appears to me to pertain only to farmers, since it is impossible that each and every artisan or hireling would seek the possession of land, nor is it advantageous that all men live in the fields. And indeed Aristotle’s words in the text tend in this direction. For he says as follows: To make the people enthusiastic for agriculture, the laws once passed among certain peoples helped and were beneficial. The laws I just rehearsed follow as the next words in the text. Hence I gather that the common folk are to be inspired to the useful pursuit of agriculture, which I prove thus, partially from this passage and partially from others. In every republic it is necessary that this should occur, therefore it must occur. The antecedent is agreed, since without this pursuit and labor the republic cannot be preserved. Next, noblemen, merchants, hirelings and workmen serve other uses and positions of the republic, therefore it is expedient that the common folk be enticed to this pursuit alone. Furthermore, the common folk have a natural bent for this work and pursuit, therefore if you add reward and praise, they will easily best all others in this art. Furthermore, no pursuit provides the commonwealth with greater or better advantages than does agriculture, therefore the magistrates should attract and exhort the people to this pursuit by offering great rewards. Finally, once upon a time all well-regulated commonwealths did this selfsame thing, therefore it indeed should be done. But this cannot be done better than in the way which Aristotle teaches here, namely that every man should own a fixed and defined parcel of land, and be forbidden to sell what he possesses or to put it in pawn. For private property creates pleasure for all men, and its perpetuity makes inheritance surer for posterity. As fathers are allured to this laborious burden, work and pursuit by assured ownership, so their successors are by the hope and expectation of inheritance.

OBJECTIONS TO THE FIRST AND SECOND LAW

12. OBJECTION If every man were to possess a certain measure of land, and were bound by law not to sell it, his posterity would be rendered idlers, therefore this scheme for inciting the common folk to the pursuit of agriculture is insufficiently prudent, useful, and well-meditated. The antecedent is proven, since want begets labor and industry, but abundance creates torpor and laziness, as Seneca says. For, this being posited, insofar as we are somewhat lazy by nature, with that added which comes from the possession of a paternal right, doubtless we should devote ourselves to leisure and pleasure rather than business and labor.
RESPONSE You dispute as if no education existed among farmers, no habit for conducting rural business, or perhaps by a measure of land you understand a great abundance of property. But in either case you are very much deceived, for by a defined measure of land the Philosopher means a small farmstead, not rendered fertile without cultivation and effort. Therefore not only the pursuit of the family founder but also the labor of his successors is required for the harvesting of its crop, that is the intent of the law, and for that a reward is granted.
OBJECTION There is not so much sweat in agriculture as there is honor, therefore it is not fit for the common folk. The antecedent is proven, since in every distinguished republic of antiquity noble men applied themselves to this work, as we read in the history books about Cato, Quintius, Curius and six hundred others among the Romans, about Cyrus the Younger among the Persians, about Codrus among the Athenians, and about Lysander among the Spartans. Furthermore, from farmers are engendered the sturdiest men and stoutest soldiers. Finally, the farmers’ science is not entirely unacquainted with astrology and meteorology, as is evident from Hesiod and Vergil’s Georgics. But neither military discipline nor the contemplation of divine things befits the common folk, that is, the unlettered multitude and throng of mankind, therefore neither does the pursuit of agriculture pertain to the common folk.
RESPONSE It must be admitted that once honorable men ennobled this science of agriculture, nor am I denying here that this science in a certain sense the contemplation of heaven, earth and the seasons pertains to it. But I think that those gentlemen worked the plow for pleasure, not out of necessity, and that this contemplation of heaven, earth and the seasons was once and now is natural experience more than a science, observation more than demonstration. For farmers are not astrologers or philosophers by art, but rather by practice; not by science but by nature and long experience of affairs.

Chapter v

Are the goods of the condemned to be consecrated to God rather than being given to princes and paupers in the republic?

ERE is an analysis of this chapter: it deals with the preservation of popular government, to which end five precepts are adduced. The first is that it is the duty of legislators, not only in this but in every form of the republic, to strive by legislation not only that the commonwealth should exist but that it should preserved as long as possible. For just as life in the human body is not only to live but to thrive, so in the commonwealth the assembled multitude is of little avail if there be no wholesome ordering and enduring preservation of it. For not just association, but association’s long duration and intact condition makes a commonwealth. The second precept is that the goods of the condemned should not be given to princes, not to paupers, but that they be consecrated to sacred uses: not to princes, lest an immoderate thirst for gain make them tyrants; not to paupers, lest the hope of reward transform them into murderers and cruel accusers. For the greed for gold is accursed, and Crassus’ gold choked its owner. The third is that exquisite punishments should be visited on false and treacherous accusers, so when this law has been publicized there will be less frequent trials, fewer perjuries and punishments. Oh how unhappy the commonwealth in which which the death of innocents and the life of the depraved hang over cauterized consciences! Oh how happy and blessed the one which does away with suborned witnesses and denouncers! For who lives in security if it is permitted any man to bear false witness against whoever he chooses? The fourth is that where there are small or no revenues for a republic, there should be fewer public assemblies, but where the income is great and manifold, senates should be convened more frequently, but in such a way that the goods which about should not be shared out to the people immediately, but be stored up in the commonwealth’s public treasury. For in receiving a dividend the public is like a perforated barrel or jar. As a perforated barrel gradually takes in at one place and spills out at another, so the multitude no sooner receives everything than it squanders it. But care must be taken lest the people be afflicted by extreme misfortune and misery, for this is the shipwreck of democracy. Hence the fifth precept, namely that it is useful either only to give to those oppressed and suffering from want so much as is required for the purchase of a small plot of ground, or that suffices to set them up trading and hawking wares, or (in the manner of the Carthaginians and Tarentine) to entice them to goodwill and peacefulness by sharing out their own beasts of burden and occasionally the fruits of their own possessions among the needy and poor, whom, thus enriched, they admitted to magistracies and positions of dignity chosen now by lot, now by election.
2. So much for the exposition of the text. Now I come to the question, which is whether the good of condemned men are to be consecrated to God rather than being given to princes or paupers. In every wisely administered commonwealth it is needful that the putrid parts, of whose health hope has been abandoned, be cut off from the body politic, lest their contagion spread pestilent vapors into all the veins and bowels of the whole. So, just as the scepter is rightly due to the good and the earnest, so is the sword to wicked evildoers. But lest the members perish without cause, justice should have mercy and prudence for her companions, so that she will be as a kindly mother if she sees hope of virtue, but as a careful and severe one if she perceives the monstrosity of crime. Hence hearings, tribunals and superior courts are established in every commonwealth, so that no man of high, middling or low estate may be convicted without the rule of law and the judge’s careful attention. It is not permissible, nay it is horrible, to strangle, stab, or in any other manner whatsoever put to death wretches imprisoned in jail and chains with no sentence of condemnation having been pronounced, in despite of justice, humanity and nature. But here the question arises, should condemned men’s goods be consecrated to God and sacred uses? The Philosopher maintains that they should. The arguments by which I prove this are four: from suitabilities, from outcomes, from contraries, and from an end. From suitabilities, since reason demands that the price of shed blood be offered up to God (the judge and avenger of crimes), like victims. But, you say, God has no need of gold and gems. This true, nor has He need for your prayers. And yet He looked favorably on the widow’s mite, He did not scorn the prayers of Cornelius and the woman of Canaan. “What? You wish that the resources of the condemned be given to God?” I wish it. “But who will receive them?” God, by the hands of paupers within the Church. “But mark you, the High Priests refused the thirty pieces of silver Judas brought to the temple, saying it was not allowed them to put them in the Temple treasury, since they were blood money.” What then? “Therefore it is impermissible to consecrate the goods of the condemned (which are blood money) to God.” You are wrong, and in many ways, for the first thing was the price of the innocent Lamb most feloniously betrayed, accused and betrayed, but the case and condition of the justly condemned is quite different. Furthermore, having made this judgment, with this same money the priests bought a potters’ field for the burial of strangers, and put that price to a sacred purpose, not a profane one, as Holy Scripture teaches.
3. My second argument is taken from outcomes, for when men understand that the goods of the condemned are consecrated to God, both accused and accusers, stricken by a certain religious awe, will often be more wary against sinning and setting snares. For they will be terrified lest God, having peered deeply into their minds’ inmost feelings and thoughts, will exact blood money from them if they set their snares by unjustly accusing others, that He will exact crime’s forfeit from them if they live as malefactors. Hence, as I think, it has been ordained that the goods of those who lay violent hands upon themselves are owed to sacred uses, a custom still prevalent among the English. This can be demonstrated from contraries, since, should princes or the multitude possess these goods, there will be oppression rather than safety, strife and sedition rather than public peace. For if Ahab should ardently covet Naboth’s vineyard and suffer a repulse, employing suborned witnesses he will rage against his life and his blood. But if he should learn that the grapes of the vineyard are owed to God, not himself, he will deal more peacefully, and seek no stone with which to smash a just man. If the poor should likewise discover that no profit or gain will be coming to them from the death of the condemned, they will set aside their wolfish appetite for blood, and eminent men will sail safely into harbor. For the multitude rages against nobles when it hopes that it will gain a fine prize, their blood having been spilt. Lest, therefore, either oppressors of the poor or accusers of the noble go flitting about the market and the theater, better dealings occur in that republic in which the goods of the condemned are conceded to God rather than to the prince or the multitude. The final argument is drawn from the end, but the end of this law is twofold, human and divine: human in respect to the peace of citizens and the quiet of the commonwealth, divine in respect to the worship of the eternal godhead. For confirmation of the former, I shall only quote Aristotle’s words in the text. He speaks thus: If this is law is enacted that nothing belonging to the condemned should become public property, but should be consecrated, those who commit unjust crimes will be no less on guard against sinning (for they will be fined no less), and the boorish, impolite multitude will be less ready and prone to condemn accused men, since it will make no gain thereby. From these words I conclude that it is much more wholesome for the commonwealth (if we look just at the political form) that the republic be founded without this hateful crew of accusers and pestilential offscouring. For what peace, what quiet can there be for if men like Zoilus and dogs and wolves dressed in sheep’s clothing lurk and lie in wait in every corner, at every table, in every household? This begets mistrust and horrid suspicion among citizens, sets their minds ablaze with detestable hatred, snatches the unwary off to the gallows, and in the end draws everybody to the movement of sedition. But, the goods of the condemned being put to sacred uses, this all will be avoided, as, if you consider the political end, it is better to consecrate condemned men’s goods to God than to men.
4. What am I to say of the divine use which depends on this donative? Nobody, I fancy, fails to understand that, the goods of the Church Militant being in this way enhanced, a greater reverence will be shown to religion. For take away all the honor, order and majesty in the Church, take away, indeed, the Church itself, since, even if Christ did not appoint His Apostles lords of the earth, yet the possession of the world is rightfully owed to the holy and the Elect. For, as the Apostle says, God’s works and creatures are faint with eagerness to be given into the hands of the Elect. Those who brought wood, stones, gold and adornments for building Solomon’s temple were not scorned by the Lord. The widow is praised for sending her mite to the Temple treasury. Magdalene is praised for pouring precious oil over the feet of Christ. Joseph of Aramathea is praised for covering His body with shroud and tomb. They are praised who give their offerings to the altar, their tithes to the priest, their firstfruits to God. Now my words tend in the direction of making us think it wrong if the houses in which we puny men dwell are like palaces, and the churches in which we worship God are like stables; if, I say, we worms glut ourselves like hogs, and God’s ministers live suffering from want like slaves. I am not here urging that men lord it in the Church like kings, for Christ forbade this. But I crave this wholeheartedly, that all reward of dignity and splendor not be stripped from the Church. For the Church is like the moon, which, albeit it sometimes suffers a great eclipse, still does not lose all the light of its dignity. This dignity ought to be enhanced, partly by the gifts of the living, partly by the goods of the dying and the condemned. Even if it is in doubt to whom restitution is owed, it is true that it is best advised that these goods be offered and consecrated to God. For he can put them to better use in His Church, since out of evil things God frequently produces glory for Himself and honor for His church, not because bad things are approved by God, because He (existing as the Greatest Good) is wont to turn all things to the good, not otherwise than fire is wont to transform all things into fire. “But tell me what will become of paupers if condemned men’s goods be consecrated only to God and the Church? Surely it is better that they be sold and divided among the poor.” This is a great show of charity, but was the grumble of Judas, who held the purse, as if the goods of the Church are not the goods of the poor. It is assured that, just as Cornelius’ prayers and acts of charity were offered to God by the angel, so are the goods of the Church by the hands of the poor. Indeed, rather than have God’s flock fail by famine, Lawrence the presbyter will sell off the precious Temple plate, and, scorning the tyrant’s threats, will share and bestow it upon the poor.

THE DISTINCTION OF THE QUESTION

 

AN OBJECTION TO THE CHAPTER’S FIRST CONCLUSION

5. OBJECTION In the first conclusion of this chapter Aristotle forbids that excessively popular laws be established in democracy, or excessively consular or senatorial ones in oligarchy or the power of the wealthy. To do so is to prostrate and undermine these constitutions of the republic, therefore it appears that here he is disputing about these forms imprudently and ill-advisedly. The minor premise is proven, since popular power is most greatly defended by popular decrees, but the authority of the wealthy most by consular edicts. The reason is that the human body is best preserved by similar things, so the body civil and politic is preserved by things not contrary.
RESPONSE These constitutions are considered in two ways, either inchoatively or absolutely: inchoatively, and thus in their establishment lawmakers should look not just to the similarity of decree and law, but also the commonwealth’s progress and preservation. For if, for example, in its first creation the founders of a popular power should establish very popular laws, because of the remnants of the previous constitution a danger of sedition would arise. Aristotle therefore urges that those who are founding either a popular constitution or the power of the wealthy should consider the length of its preservation rather than the similarity of law, and that they slowly and gradually bring the citizens along from their old manners to the intended form.

OBJECTIONS TO THE QUESTION

6. OBJECTION If the goods of the condemned are consecrated to God, the denunciation of men will not cool down or become rarer, therefore this reasoning of the question is not rightly assigned by the Philosopher. The antecedent is agreed, since insidious men will strive to govern and dissimulate their malice and envy under a cloak of religion and piety towards God, with the result that they shall appear welcome to God and pious men, and by their burning zeal will often be carried more fiercely against the just and the innocent.
RESPONSE It must be confessed that monstrous malice often lurks under a cloak of religion: for who speaks more chastely than the adulterer, more piously and religiously than the dissimulator, more justly than the malevolent waylayer of blood and life? But, things having been compared, if condemned men’s goods are consecrated to God, denunciations should be rarer: even if the envious and the malicious are perhaps more frequent in accusing others under this pretext, nevertheless the greedy and the destitute will wholly desist from accusers’ wiles, cheated of all hope of reward.
OBJECTION The goods of the condemned are profane, and, as it were, tainted by the hands of malefactors, therefore they should not be consecrated to God. The antecedent is agreed, since they are often ill-gotten and destined to wicked uses by these fellows. The reasoning holds, since only holy, pure things befit God.
RESPONSE As physicians make most wholesome antidotes out of tempered poisons, so God turns to good uses the profane goods of the condemned. For offerings and donatives have, if I may so say, a sanctification from the Church, from the altar, from Christ. Just as He turned the sale of Joseph, which was evil, into the salvation of his brothers, which was good, so He converts the goods of the condemned, even if gained and, as it were, tainted by the hands of rascals, to holy uses.
7. OBJECTION Grown great on the goods of the condemned, religion is rendered haughty and proud, and in these ways is drawn aside either into a base forgetfulness of God or into truculent rebellion. Thus enriched, it begets wealth, and this daughter (as the proverb has it) will devour her mother. Furthermore, the sayings of Christ are take up the cross and follow Me. He does not say take up gold and the world. And again, go and sell all you own, and give it to the poor. Then too, a man cannot serve both God and Mammon. Also, he who wishes to be the first among you will be your servant. Add to this that the Prophets, the Apostles, Christ Himself, the martyrs and all the Saints have embraced poverty, nakedness and death, not abundance, pleasure and life. Therefore neither wealth, honor, nor authority ought to be sought within the Church herself. Our savior Christ had no place to lay his head, so does it behoove us poor men to slumber most soundly, wrapped in linen and feathers? Does it behoove us to strut about, proudly adorned in purple, gold, gems, and other most vain colors?
RESPONSE These are words and ornaments, not arguments. Thus those who wish to shatter the powers of the Church flex the sinews of theology. Wherefore I shall reply to your individual points: first I say that it is not religion that is smothered by the glittering grains of wealth, but rather her pernicious stewards, who seek after the fleece, not the sheep. The daughter indeed has devoured the mother, but this malfeasance belongs to Man, not to religion, who turns to the best uses the goods dedicated to herself. All the experiences of Christ teach humility, yet do not strip all dignity and honor from the Church (to whom He gave the most). Take up the cross, you say, sell everything, shun Mammon. Oh that you would be willing! But these things instruct us not to keep our eyes fixed on the mirrors of this world. The examples you produce do not deny the use of His creations in the Church. For among the Prophets were kings and those who consorted with kings. Among the Apostles and martyrs were bishops, doctors, deacons, and those possessed of great authority, and for the carriage of their dignity they were not supported by the same resources of wealth as we are now. The reason is that then the Church existed amidst continual torment and persecution, and converted kings did not yet exist as its patrons, queens as its nurses. But now tell me what splendor would there be in the house of God, in the family of Christ, if by the guidance of a star kings did not offer incense, gold and myrrh, that is, if generous men moved by the influence of divine grace should not offer to gifts and (if I may speak thus) holy benefices to God, if God’s ministers should not be suffered to live among mortals (who are not moved by the Spirit so much as by sense and authority) endowed with any priesthoods, any honors? And how can bishops be hospitable, as the blessed Apostle requires, if they should lack all dignity and outward honor? Their praise and commendation shines in this, if amidst an ocean and abundance of wealth they maintain themselves as servants, as austere, chaste and temperate.

THE CHAPTER’S DOUBTFUL QUESTION
Should false accusers suffer the same penalties which they have intended for others?

8. You deserve the gallows, malicious Haman, for having designed to unjustly destroy Mordecai upon the gallows. You wanton old men, how unjustly you condemned Susanna to stoning! But how justly you submitted to the same blow! That deed of yours is memorable, most august Darius, when you pitched Daniel’s false accusers headlong into the lions’ den. The face of the accuser is black, his name is hateful. But (oh our times!) how easy it is nowadays to find false accusers and suborned witnesses against Naboth, against Stephen, against Christ! Nature’s saying does not move them, do not do to others what you do not wish done to yourself. Christ’s saying makes no impression upon them, the measure by which you measure others is that by which you yourselves will be measured. So why should I repeat Aristotle’s opinion here, which teaches that there will be fewer courts and tribunals in the republic if the gravest punishments are appointed for those who falsely accuse others? Words and herbs, as the story has it, could not make the boy climb down from the tree when he was stealing the old man’s apples, but the power of bringing him down was discovered in a stone. Thus very frequently, when nature and grace make no impression on bad men, fear of punishments will compel them to their duty. Wisely, therefore, the Philosopher urges that the most serious punishments be appointed for slanderers and denouncers, and that they incur the same blow they strove to administer to others, since if it should be free for any man to summon and accuse anybody of a capital crime according to his whim, in what condition will be the sheep and the innocent? The lamb will not drink at the fountain without the wolf groundlessly accusing it; it will lawlessly devour it. But if the lambs’ innocence should be revealed and the bloodsucking wolves suffer the punishment they had designed, there would be more lambs and fewer wolves, more sheep and fewer foxes, more innocent men and fewer treacherous accusers. Therefore in the republic the same penalty that hangs over the accused should be visited on oath-breaking witnesses and false accusers. If a little snake or other nasty little beast should attack a man, it is straightway caught and killed, and yet it is only following its nature. So is it fitting that a man born to humanity should practice with impunity so great a felony as unjust thirst for another man’s blood, unpunished and unchastised? Is it fitting that Cain should live in honor, his brother’s blood spilt, and not die beneath a hedge, a reprobate and a wretch? Nature taught us to ward off force with force, justice has confirmed this law, so when snares set against men’s lives are detected, why is not permissible to coerce them with the punishment that has been attempted? But, you will say, nature has given us this law but grace has repealed it, calling those men blessed who withstand the fires and storms of persecution for justice’s sake. This is true, but Christ did not wish that the civil sword lie quite idle in avenging evils. For even if a man is more just who submit to an unjust death, it is nevertheless no unjust law which inflicts the same wound on false accusers.
9. Zacharias, unjustly slain, said as he died, May God see this and requite it. The blood of the innocent has a shrill, swift, penetrating voce. Therefore at his stoning Stephen said in imitation of Christ, Forgive them, Lord, they know not what they do, yet the martyr’s patience which is taught to us does not wholly abolish the punishment of the false witness, which is justly administered. For, just as the former savors of divine wisdom, the latter smacks of divine justice, which (as is told in Scripture) gave the false accusers of Daniel. Mordecai and Susanna over to the lions, the gallows, the stone. If you consider the outcomes of this thing, in wondrous wise you will give them your approval, for evildoers, dreading lest they greet the same gallows to which they strive to drag the others they envy, will readily desist from their wily schemings against other men’s lives, and contrive no more to harm and wound their fellow citizens. For, just as impunity renders many men bold for every felony, so severity of punishment makes them more careful and kind in their accusing. Finally, to conclude in a word, divine and human tablets of the law prove this, therefore it is no impermissible thing. Divine ones tolerate no unavenged injury and felony. Human ones display this too, as among the Romans, who once commanded that an accuser who alleged a crime he could not prove should suffer the same punishment as the accused would have, had he been convicted. Hence citizens’ life shines without fraud, liberty without fear, honor without loathing, the courtroom without the harm and evil of injury.
10. OBJECTION Accusers are necessary in the republic, therefore they are deserving of no punishment. The antecedent is proven, since where the severity of accusation is absent, there the liberty or rather the monstrosity of sinning thrives, since men live more savagely and direly when they know they themselves are safe from accusation.
RESPONSE I am not denying here that accusers are necessary in the republic, but I plainly teach that insidious butchers and false accusers are to be visited with the same punishment they have designed for others. For, just as the safety of the commonwealth reposes in just accusation, so does a lethal virus and wound in false, insidious slander.
OBJECTION Christ prayed for His accusers, and bade us patiently suffer all slander and insult, therefore it is not permissible to afflict and wound false accusers with a like punishment. The reasoning holds, since when an equal punishment is inflicted and requited, vengeance is sought, which genuine patience denies us.
RESPONSE Patience denies us resistance, not justice. If the butcher rages, blessed is he who patiently bears his cross in a just cause, for he he has his reward in heaven and with God. Therefore, though each individual man is commanded not to resist privately, it is nonetheless relegated to justice and the magistrate to condemn those who set snares against life and blood. Therefore it is possible both to suffer and yet to punish, to forgive and yet to gain vengeance.

Chapter vi

Is oligarchy the opposite of democracy in every respect?
Do the worst forms of republics always demand stronger protections?

OW that popular power has been described, a description of oligarchy or the power of the wealthy must follow. This chapter is short and its analysis by far the shortest, since here the comparison of those constitutions is made exclusively by antithesis and opposition. One should therefore remember that in Book IV the Philosopher set forth four species of democracy and the like number of oligarchy, and in express words states that the individual ones each are opposed and diametrically unlike their counterparts: Each species of oligarchy pertains and is related to the opposing democracy: that oligarchy which is first and most temperate is opposed to the first and best democracy, and this is the one which is closest and most akin to the polity. For the first species of the power of the wealthy makes the election of its magistrates according to estates both large and small. Hence access to the republic is open not only to men like Croesus but also to men like Fabricius, that is, not only to the prosperous, but also to poor men and those blessed with a middling fortune. For in this form of oligarchic government magistrates are divided into necessary ones which the moderately wealthy occupy, and lofty ones which only well-to-do and lavish citizens perform, who can support and ornament the pomp and majesty of the commonwealth. Here it is to be noticed that the remaining three species of oligarchy decline by degrees from this amity and favoring of the people, and increasingly tend towards the unbridled tyranny of the wealthy and the oppression of the multitude. For, though the first species admits men to the seats of magistracies in accordance with the size of their estate, the third demands a large entry-fee (which paupers can rarely afford) and debars the greatest portion of the multitude from the hope and fruit of dignity. But the fourth species, wholly domineering and tyrannical, entirely excludes all but the moneyed and the powerful. If you fitly compare these degrees and species of oligarchy with those modes and forms of democracy, as you easily discover a contrary nature in their oppositions, so by their comparison you will readily find the same system. For (as the philosophers say) the nature of contraries is different, but the science of their understanding is the same.
2. But (that I may come closer to discussing the question) in this comparison the word “opposition” is understood rather more broadly, not designating the battle and strife of disparates (as the dialecticians say) but also for those of relatives. Thus popular power and the power of the wealthy indeed differ and are opposites, but not in all respects. They are opposites regarding their material, form, object and end. In their material, since in democracy the entire multitude is called the crop of the commonwealth, but in oligarchy only the wealthy crew. Since, therefore, there is a diverse assemblage of citizens in either constitution, it is rightly concluded that the material of both is different. For as the material of the commonwealth consists in the assemblage of its citizens, so its form consists of their ordering and union. But that they have diverse forms is clear from this, that in them there are different orderings, different laws and schemes of administration. For in the one is a favoring of the people, in the other is their muttering and grief. Furthermore, leading men are, as it were, forms of the commonwealth, but in these there are different leading men and magistrates, therefore each has a distinct form. What am I to say of their objects, when in the popular constitution all men aim at community, but in the power of the wealth at private advantage? The common and the private differ in their objects, therefore these two constitutions are different. Finally, who is unaware that the end of democracy is freedom of living, but that of oligarchy the thirst for and accumulation of wealth? For the people is swept along towards liberty of life as its summum bonum, whereas that of the wealthy crew is affluence of property, liberty of living and greed for gold are different things, therefore these two constitutions differ in their ends. Here I shall not add a distinction of their laws, variety of magistrates, difference of societies, and many other things in which these two species are greatly distinguished, for many men govern in democracy, few in oligarchy. Again, in the former men live as they will, but in the latter according to the prescript of their ancestors. Finally, equality is observed in the former, but no proportion in the latter, there is no similarity of property of persons. For in this constitution, not unlike lions, the prosperous stake a claim on one part of the republic because of their excellence, a second because of their power, a third because of justice (as they say) because they are allegedly the lights of the commonwealth. But they snatch the final one for themselves, for if you deny them, they withdraw their friendship. Therefore Irus is left with his wallet and staff, but the belt with which he should gird himself is snatched away by the taloned hand of the powerful. Among these species of oligarchy which the Philosopher compares here with their opposing forms of democracy, the final is by far the worst and (as he says in the text) the most similar to the power and tyranny of dynasts, since in it are the fewest magistrates, and these are men like Timon and Draco, who take delight in the blood and butchery of citizens, who reap but do not sow, who bestow nothing but devastate everything, who wound but do not heal, who destroy citizens but do not preserve them. And (to use the Philosopher’s words) to the degree that this species is the worst, it needs and requires the greatest caution and custody.
v 3. From this is taken the doubtful question now before us, whether the worst forms of the republic demand greater and stronger protections. Aristotle maintains that they do, and so do I. Here it is to be noted that the Philosopher is not urging that vicious and unjust governments (whose downfall and eclipse he hopes for) are to be preserved, but his understanding is that, once they have crept in, they cannot long be preserved unless they are armed by great protections. If you ask for reasons, these are the ones which I gather from here and elsewhere in Aristotle. The first is taken from a similarity, the second from a contrary, the third from a definition of violence, and the final one from induction from examples. From a similarity, for as a diseased and infirm body, an ancient and battered ship, require greater industry, care and caution for the avoidance of the danger of sickness and storm than do sound and strong ones, so governments gained by fraud and deceits, and retained by force and tyranny, are more subject to the thunderbolts and commotions of fortune if they are not protected by a more powerful hand and impulse. Why dwell on this? As youths seized by a deadly disease struggle against death most vigorously, yet fail and die in the end, so the more baleful faults of republics, that have arisen by movement of sedition in despite of nature and justice, strive for a while, but are finally stricken, totter, and finally perish. They are like the flame of lamp whose oil is running low, which can briefly be seen to shine and flicker, but suddenly goes out when the oil is extinguished, for if fraud, fury and oppression relax, these clouds and storms of commonwealths are scattered. This selfsame thing is readily proven from a contrary, for if wisdom, counsel and justice are causes of perpetual preservation in the administration of the best commonwealths, madness, rashness, and license of morals will be causes of ruin in bad ones. But, as those govern righteously and wisely sit, as it were, on the quarterdeck grasping the tiller with no great difficulty, storms calmed on all sides, so it is necessary that those who rage on Nero’s throne submit to greater difficulties and dangers in order to protect themselves and what they own. Greater care is therefore to be applied in preserving bad governments than good ones.
4. The third reason is self-evident from the definition of the violent, for if the violent is an external attack and, as it were, a storm against natur, which wears itself down by moving and acting, and if what the Philosopher teaches is also true, that no violent thing is perpetual, how can it be possible that tyrannies and deformities of republics can flourish long without the greatest difficulty? Therefore the worst forms of commonwealths demand greater and stronger protections, greater cares and supports, if they wish to endure long and be preserved. The final reason would be very fertile and troublesome if I were to fetch examples from antiquity’s annals and remains, so it suffices to put before the reader’s eyes the Roman government under its persecutors, the Scythian under its dynasts, the Persian under its demagogues and flatterers of the people, and now too the Turkish under its tyrants. Good God, how many sophistries, how many plots, how many cruel tragedies, how many monstrosities of human actions are concealed in them? All of which, now and in the past, had the purpose of propping up tumbledown, collapsing governments. But fall they must, since they have foundations of sand. This preposition can also be demonstrated from conjoined things, for deceit, force and fear are the guardians of tyrannies and bad commonwealths. But when deceit protects their gates, force their homes, fear the citadels of the magistrates themselves, swift ruin and savage misery ensue. Oh how unlucky the commonwealth in which Dionysius is compelled to fear his wife’s fidelity, his barber’s razor, his very own shadow, stricken by conscience of his malfeasances!

THE DISTINCTION OF THE QUESTION

OBJECTIONS TO THE QUESTION

5. OBJECTION Things that differ only in degree do not differ in nature, democracy and oligarchy only differ in degree, therefore they do not differ in nature. The major premise is agreed, since degree is an affection and an accident, not a nature. The minor is proven, since the first species of either constitution differ only in this, that the former has more poor, the latter elects fewer men to magistracies and offices. If you likewise compare the remaining kinds of oligarchy with the remaining forms of democracy, you will find that there is a distinction and difference of degree, not nature.
RESPONSE It is posited that these two forms of government do not differ in all things. But they do not differ in degree alone, for although in both kinds of administration paupers are admitted to the republic, yet the method is not the same, nor the ordering, or the end and intention of government in both, in which things there is a very great distinction between them, as is agreed in the analysis and demonstration of the question.
OBJECTION Those constitutions do not exist, therefore dispute about their contrariety is useless and idle, for there should be no contention about a shadow and (as they say) a nonentity.
RESPONSE First, the antecedent is denied, for these forms of governing thrive in many places. In the second place, the argument can be denied, since even if they did not now exist, a discussion of them is rightly and wisely undertaken lest we readily err in administrating the republic because they are unknown, indeed lest, if we have committed an error, we persist in it or (as people say) hasten from a bad thing to a worse.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE DOUBTFUL QUESTION

6. OBJECTION The worst commonwealths are to be destroyed in every way and by every attempt, therefore precepts for their preservation should not be given and assigned. The reasoning holds, since if precepts for preservation are given, tyrants are armed and inspired to greater daring.
RESPONSE It must be answered that precepts of their preservation are not given here, but that it is only demonstrated that governments of this kind are weak and require greater help. But if you urge that the Philosopher has given precepts for their preservation elsewhere, I reply that this was done by him, not for the purpose that they may be preserved, but that, when tyrants’ schemes and sophistries have been understood, their powers and onslaughts might be easier broken.
OBJECTION The Persian and Turkish governments have flourished a very long time, therefore violent governments can long be preserved, which is denied above.
RESPONSE Indeed they have flourished for a very long time, if by flourishing you mean savaging and raging against Christ and His Church (against Whom even the gates of Hell will long prevail). But in my sure opinion, this comes about that the Lord’s small flock may better be put to the test, and so that Sion, united in itself, will be rendered stronger. For with Hannibal knocking at the gates and hurling his missiles at the commonwealth, victory will be the more brilliant. Furthermore, if you consider the habit of barbarians and the consensus of this abject people, I deny that these governments are violent, for a thing is called violent when it vainly resists movements acting upon it.

Chapter vii

Are athletes’ gymnasia to be permitted in the well-regulated commonwealth?
Should noblemen dedicate churches to God and palaces to their city as a matter of duty?

T is the duty of the student of politics to explain, carefully and accurately, not only what commonwealths exist and how many, but also the places and climates capable of receiving them. Therefore Aristotle, after showing what democracy and oligarchy are and how they are to be distinguished, offers a distinction of men and places, so that it will be clearly understood how this one suits this people and place, and how that one suits those. There are, he says, four parts of the civil multitude: one of farmers (to which the pastoral population is subsumed); a second of artisans; a third of merchants, and a fourth of hirelings. Farmers are those who do their work on the land scientifically, and earn an honest living from it. Those who handle the sordid and illiberal arts are here called artisans. Merchants are those who deal in commerce and selling. Hirelings are those engaged to do work for a fee. These four kinds of men have respect to peace and the tranquil condition of the republic. There are also four more kinds which have respect to military matters, and who are engaged in war, viz., horsemen, heavy-armed infantry, light-armed infantry, and soldiers of the fleet, by whom war at sea is waged. Horsemen are soldiers of the knightly order, who shatter the enemy’s assault in the forefront. Heavy-armed infantry are expert soldiers, magnificently outfitted everywhere and on all sides, who fight close at hand and from a distance, not without military art. Light-armed infantry are called handy, rankers, or swift, and when the signal is given they rush against the enemy at their commander’s order. Soldiers of the fleet are veterans who contend with the enemy by sea from wooden camps and ships. If the gales of sedition are blowing up or the enemy presses, the capital hope and fortitude of the republic rests on these men. Therefore the Philosopher urges fathers to school their sons in light and easy battles while they are still young and their powers untried, so that when they come to manhood they may become artisans of military work, commanders and athletes.
2. From these words I take the question I am now about to handle, namely whether athletes’ gymnasia are to be permitted in the well-regulated commonwealth. The express words of Aristotle’s text do not require this, but their sense teaches it plainly and manifestly. For how can fathers school their sons for battles and educate them in the martial art if there are none who can teach the art of fighting and waging war? Athletic gymnasia should therefore exist, wherein the military science can be publicly practiced, and the warlike crop of the commonwealth can be raised so that when it comes to the walls, the camps, the fleets, it has the strength to overcome and vanquish warlike enemies, not only by the help of arms and horses, but also by practice and intelligence. Unlearned physicians often ruin and kill men suffering from ill health, but unschooled and unpracticed soldiers slaughter themselves. It is therefore a necessary thing that that Olympic exercises be held in well-regulated commonwealths, in which the martial science can be thoroughly learned without bloodshed, martial rage without danger, the enemy’s wiles and deceits without any fear. Wisely did Flavus Vegetius Renatus say, He who craves peace must prepare for war. He who desires victory must diligently become a soldier. He who hopes for favorable outcomes must fight with art, not chance, since nobody dares provoke, nobody dares offend a man who he knows full well will be his better, should they fight. During antiquity, in every age, in every nation and city, our ancestors honorably fostered this art. The Athenians bear witnesses to this, who put a helmet on the head of their Minerva, a spear in her hand. The Romans are witnesses, who erected their capitol on the city’s highest mountain, and for the terrification of their enemies set up a statue of Mars on its loftiest turret, sculpted in bronze with every manner of arms and artillery. Xanthippus, who overmastered and wore down Attilius Regulus and an army not so much by courage as by art, is a witness to how much their discipline in battle helped the Spartans. How many consuls, how many legions, how many lights of the Romans did the single man Hannibal of Carthage destroy by the help and aid of this art? How many cities did he sack? How many standards and camps did he take? Our own ancestors were once more distinguished in this practice and art, who had palaces and colleges full of arms-bearing gentlemen to be sent against the Turk, whose power is attested by the isles of the Rhodians, whose praise is spoken by our annals. Pray tell me whether the Romans subjected so many cities, so many nations, so many empires only by their brawn and martial onslaught? It was impossible that a handful of shepherds could make the whole world’s globe turn for all those centuries by force of nature alone, without the military art.
3. The uses of this science are countless in number, renowned in fam,e and deserving of the bugle of praise. For it turns idlers into men eager for battle, the ignorant into experts, weaklings into sturdy fellows, the unknown and obscure into greathearted generals. This science alone teaches the nature of places, the opportunity of times, the powers of enemies, their frauds, stratagems and fortifications. It alone brings schemes to light, repels fury from the walls of the commonwealth, pitches camps, readies artillery, defends the life of citizens, and preserves all the ornaments of peace. But concerning these and the countless other commodities of the military art, I urge that the books by Flavius Vegetius, Sextus Julius Frontinus and Aelian on managing armies should be read: they indeed have bequeathed posterity excellent works about military matters, sententiously written. I shall say no more about this question, since I have already disputed to nearly the same sense.
4. In the text, Aristotle continues by showing two things, namely the means of understanding what scheme is appropriate for oligarchy, and what for democracy, and also the means of preserving the power of the wealthy. The first is dealt with in these words. The cavalry, he says, and the heavy-armed infantry belongs more to the wealthy than the poor, since both branches of the service require an abundance of money. But the light-armed infantry and the nautical crew pertain to the popular constitution. Therefore a nation prone to riding and heavy-armed fighting readily obeys the government of the wealthy, whereas one born for lighter fighting supports the people’s government. The other thing in the text contains three precepts for preserving the power of the wealthy. The first is that in the republic some things should also be conceded to the people, as once was done among the Thebans and the citizens of Massilia. For when allured by the hope of benefits, it embraces the republic the more. The second is that that offices of their duty be imposed on the leading men of a prosperous commonwealth: thus the people will remain without a share in the administration, of its own volition and with a cheerful will, and will most readily forgive those performing magistracies, as if they were paying a great fee for their right to govern, which paupers would neither wish or able to attain and support. The people hates private luxury, but adores public magnificence.
5. From these things arises our doubtful question, whether noblemen should dedicate churches to God and palaces to their city as a matter of duty. Oh the great collapse of things, oh the wretched old age of our times! In what age are we living? What? Are we speaking of dedicating churches to God, of building cities? Oh that we would not be acting in vain! Now there is no need for a thousand men to hew down a thousand trees and for eighty masons to square a thousand stones for destined for Solomon’s temple, now fewer artisans and workmen would serve the need. Rather there is need nowadays that King Cyrus would bid it be proclaimed through all the realms, The God of heaven has instructed me to build Him a house in Jerusalem. Who among you belongs to His people? If God be with him, let him go down to Jerusalem. Where are men like Justinian, where are men like Constantine, where are all the generous patrons of a Church reborn and failing? Their ashes come flying out of their tombs, as once did the sparks of Memnon, and from their eroded, ransacked monuments they sing perennial praises. Come, you false politicians, or rather you feigned Christians, cast down churches with Persian fury, cry out with loud voices that Christ does not dwell in churches built by human hand. But remember this one thing, if it please you, God once had His tabernacle and His ark, Christ and His Apostles did not hold the material Temple in contempt. For otherwise He would scarcely have said, The temple gold is no more holy than the temple, otherwise they would not have gone up to the Temple at the hour of prayer. Christ said, Go and speak, standing in the temple of the people. Speaking of this Temple, He said, My house is a house of prayer, but you have made it a den of thieves. What? With lashes He drove the sellers of doves out of the Temple, and are we to think He would have done nothing had He found them demolishing its pillars? But you will perhaps say I should speak to the point. I have assuredly not strayed from my subject, for I argue thus. As has been proven, God wants churches to be consecrated to Himself. But paupers cannot perform this work. Therefore noblemen should submit to this task as a part of their duty. Now I shall add Aristotle’s words: It behooves them (he is speaking of nobles) to make great sacrifices and spend their money on the construction of some public work when they enter upon magistracies, so that the people, seeing their city ornamented in part by temples, and in part by fine buildings, will cheerfully see the form of administrating the republic remain and endure.
6. From these words I derive three reasons and arguments for the confirmation of the doubtful question: the first is from God’s viewpoint, the second from the commonwealth’s, and the third from that of the people and the multitude, to each of which a just and perpetual duty is owing from the noblemen. If, therefore, noble and illustrious men consecrate churches to God, out of esteem for their religiosity the people will especially admire them with all the more honor for their piety’s sake, and will tolerate their government much more reverently. And if as a matter of duty they bestow buildings upon the city, the people will likewise more gladly yield its right of obedience, both because it cannot furnish such a magnificent work itself, and because it has seen the commonwealth to be more honored by their munificence and liberality. The third reason is from the multitude’s viewpoint, since men of the lowest conditions most love and admire men when they perceive themselves to be enhanced by their benefices, and the people gathers great emoluments from those gifts given in common to God, the city and itself. Thus nothing is more useful than to impose this office on noblemen, so that they create ornaments of this kind for the commonwealth. For reverence follows on the raising of churches, admiration upon the splendor of buildings, popular affection upon largess of gifts and benefices. The people will adore worshipers of God, it will admire largess, it will love and embrace the liberal. Cyrus and Darius did this selfsame thing among the Persians, and Numa Pompilius and Servius Tullus among the Romans. It is lamentable that this honorable charity should grow chill among Christians. They say that in the city of Venice you can see sixty-two most august churches, seven and twenty nunneries and the like number of monasteries? Why am I seeking distant examples? Once England flowered with noblemen’s spectacles and monuments of this kind, and I pray Christ that, by the example of the few that build nowadays, more are drawn to a similar office of charity. I am now in my forty-sixth year, and in this time I have seen many distinguished edifices put up for private use, but few churches and colleges constructed and built for the worship of the divine godhead. I cannot, nor should I pass by in silence Thomas White and Thomas Pope, gentlemen who founded two colleges at Oxford, and that honorable gentleman Walter Mildmay and that venerable old man Doctor Caius, which two dedicated colleges to God and the Muses at Oxford. I am not writing this to provoke any persons, for let my writings be free of all satire and silly reprehension, but so I might spur the sleeping spirits of distinguished men to imitating the noble works and follow in the footprints of their ancestors. May God grant that the sterility of our times be turned into Sarah’s laughter and fruitfulness!

THE DISTINCTION OF BOTH QUESTIONS

ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE FIRST QUESTION

7. OBJECTION Athletes’ gymnasia make men bold, rash and seditious, therefore they should not be tolerated in a well-regulated commonwealth. The antecedent is proven, since men schooled in the art of war become more savage and fierce. The reason is that, since war is contrary to nature and aims at the destruction of things, so the martial art makes men violent, raging and cruel, and removes all gentleness and mercy from the human spirit; nay, it virtually turns them into beasts.
RESPONSE These faults belong to Man, not the art. For however much protracted employment in war may render men fiercer, there is nonetheless a bridle in the art of war, there is a certain moderation, and although wrath, death, fury, and six hundred other evils of the commonwealth appear to attend upon this science, yet it is not so, but this art is inculcated so that we may live according to laws in war not otherwise than in peace, and injure no man unjustly and furiously.
OBJECTION War is the scourge of God, the avenger of crime, the bane of the commonwealth, the downfall of peace, therefore this science is not to be practiced. The reasoning holds, since that which is simply evil should not be admitted into the commonwealth, and this science is simply evil. The minor premise is proven, since it arises from a bad cause, namely from war. And that war is bad is agreed from its definition.
RESPONSE All those concomitants of war which you allege in the preceding proposition demonstrate that war is an evil of punishment, not an evil of guilt, for when a just cause exists war is called just and honorable. Furthermore I deny the argument, for even if faults are simply evil, yet the science of them is good. For it does not always necessarily follow that if causes are good or bad their effects are likewise such, unless these are compared with those in the same genus of good and bad, as the Philosopher teaches in Book II of the Topics. But here the comparison is otherwise, for since war is an evil contrary to nature, you conclude that the science of war is evil contrary to justice, which is a moral evil, not a natural one.
OBJECTION Walls fall when breached by assault rather than art, cities yield to force of arms, not orators’ eloquence. Archimedes’ mathematical head did not protect Syracuse when Marcellus assaulted the city. Military since is therefore taught in vain, when Hercules Furens is enacted in battle.
RESPONSE The theft of the Palladium was Troy’s fatal downfall, but this idol was stolen by schemes and art, not force of arms. Manufactured by wonderful art, the Trojan Horse deceived its citizens. Therefore, although I concede that walls are not pulled down, cities not overthrown and sacked without force of arms, yet I do not reject the military art. Rather I wish Aeneas and Hector, art and Mars, to be conjoined.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE SECOND QUESTION

8. OBJECTION In every republic nobles are most free, therefore they should not be compelled as a matter of duty to decorate the commonwealth with statues and temples (as Aristotle says here). The reasoning is proven, since compulsion destroys liberty, a burden placed on office obscures dignity’s splendor. Indeed, that benefice is feeble and unwelcome which is given by unwilling men under compulsion.
RESPONSE To ornament the commonwealth with statues and temples is not to destroy liberty, but rather to enhance it, nor am I urging in this context that noblemen be compelled to these monuments of their virtue. But this is what I want (since this should be done to the honor of God and the commonwealth, and since paupers cannot perform it), that as a matter of duty honorable men should do this. I say as a matter of duty, since it is a mark of grateful men to repay much with a little.
OBJECTION God is not bound by places and stone-wrought churches, He is not circumscribed by volumes of air, therefore it is superstitious to consecrate to God shrines destined to fall down. The antecedent is agreed, since God is an unbounded, invisible spirit, wholly everywhere yet circumscribed by no place. Hence it is said that He does not dwell in churches made by human hand. The reasoning is proven, since it is vain to confine to a corner of the commonwealth God’s majesty, which heaven and earth cannot comprehend.
RESPONSE Some men have rightly said a womb has born that which heaven has not contained. If for a while He lay concealed in a virgin’s womb, why should He not remain in churches? He spoke to Moses from a bush, from an Ark, from a tabernacle, from a mountain, so why should He not dispute with doctors in the Temple? God has no need of money, yet He did not scorn the widow’s mite. Indeed I confess He is everywhere in His essence, yet it is not absurd for Him to remain in churches if you consider His promise. Therefore those who dedicate a church to Christ seem to build a house or tabernacle in which God desires, as it were, to speak and dwell with men. Oh God, I pray You to raise up many Solomons and wise men to build You churches, palaces for the city, monuments of enduring fame for themselves!

Chapter viii

Are magistrates rightly divided into their species?

INCE the commonwealth without the magistrate is like the body without soul and life, after the Philosopher has taught why and out of what elements republics are constructed, he deemed it necessary for us to consider who, how many, and what sort of men magistrates should be, since from them, as if from fountains, flow the motion, life, sense and intellect of the commonwealth. Aristotle has touched on this material in a few words beforehand, but now handles it more fully and in more detail. In this delirium and climacteric year of the world I am dealing with good magistrates since, Nobody has a mind mindful of our supreme Father above, nobody sends his sighs aloft. Wrath, superstition, grief, discord, wantonness, dark thirst for blood, thirst for wine, and thirst for gold, envy, adultery, treachery, slander and theft: their deformed faces make us shudder, they are threatening in their carriage. Proud ambition swells, learning waxes haughty, eloquence thunders, hidden fraud ties its knots. As they say, we are trying to wash a brick and an Ethiopian, for it is written that in these days no flesh, not even the just, can be saved, if Christ’s advent is further prorogued. “So why are you writing now?” you perhaps ask. I shall tell you the reason, it is because when men are diseased there is need of a physician, but when the world is delirious there is need of medicine. Therefore we must strive that the eyes of the commonwealth are clear and keen-sighted, lynx-like in seeking out the guilt of evils, not like those of eagles in hunting for prey and reward.
2. But having digressed a trifle, I return to myself. Having briefly set forth his purpose, Aristotle divides magistracy into two fundamental kinds, and describes magistrates’ line of predication (as the dialecticians say). The kinds are two, necessary office, without which the commonwealth cannot exist, and common and less necessary office, without which it does not remain splendid and ornamented. This first kind is divided into political magistracy, which deals with civil matters, and theoretic, which deals with divine ones. Again, the political magistrate is either superior or inferior: sitting at the helm, the former grips the rudder of the commonwealth, whereas the latter manages common but nonetheless necessary things both within and without the city. Hence in the text many urban magistracies and many suburban ones are identified as being subordinate species. The other kind of supreme magistracy, namely the less necessary, has many species, of which I shall speak when I have first briefly described the necessary ones. First among the necessary magistrates is the aedile or supervisor of the market, who presides over things to be bought and sold needful both for dress and nourishment. His task is to reduce everything to equality, and, as a matter of faith and office, to take care lest anything be wanting for a sufficiency of life. Another is called the supervisor of works, whose duty is to be vigilant lest the buildings and roads of the commonwealth become tumbledown and unsightly. In populous cities he has many subordinates under him, such as are the inspectors of walls, fountains and harbors whom Arcadius calls limenarchae. Another is defined as the collector or quaestor, whose job is to collect public revenues and incomes, and to disburse and pay them out for public expenses. The fourth is the master of archives and rolls, and it pertains to his office to catalogue and preserve the public documents of the commonwealth, so that from his archive, as from a sacred office, may be retrieved the decrees and opinions of princes and judges concerning matters of controversy.
3. The fifth is the prefect of the prison, who is responsible for the execution of judgments (if a man be either condemned or accused). His office, says the Philosopher, is full of unpopularity and often incurs great hatred and considerable risk. For it is unpopular to brandish a sword bloody from the hand of the judge, and risky to turn it against the condemned criminal. Although, if a great salary is not offered, men refuse this magistracy, it is nevertheless necessary since judgments are passed in vain if their end and execution does not follow. For litigations about matters of justice are useless unless adjudged matters are brought to a conclusion. As Seneca says, wrest the sword from the hands of justice and the sinews of the commonwealth are hamstrung. Therefore in this kind of magistracy it will be politic and most well advised if some men pronounce sentence of life and death and others exact the punishment and example from the accused and condemned. For to both condemn and exact the penalty is to incur a double odium, and renders men excessively hateful and loathsome. Hence indeed it comes about that, for the most part, good men shun this magistracy. For they perceive the hatred, they see the risk. Therefore it is expedient to recruit a number of men for this office, so that one passes the sentence, and another inflicts the punishment. Indeed, when great and perilous matters are handled, it will be a good idea for men recently called to the bench to pass judgment on the accused lest their elders be wounded by intolerable unpopularity. This is established by the example of the Athenians in the text.
4. I shall now continue and briefly rehearse the other magistracies in which a greater splendor and species of dignity is apparent. First among these are the wardens of the commonwealth, to whom pertains the entire protection of the city. It is their duty to keep watch and exercise vigilance that the gates, treasuries and walls of the commonwealth be protected from the force and fraud of its enemies, both internal and external. Under their command are the gatekeepers, prefects of the walls, and guardians of the cisterns. Others in this class of the commonwealth are called generals or military commanders, to whom is entrusted all the care and administration of martial affairs. To them are subordinated the cavalry, infantry both lightly and heavily armed, archers, soldiers of the fleet, sailors and ordinary soldiers. These magistracies have the particular titles of admiralty of the fleet, mastery of the horse, commands of battalions or legions, and other similar offices about which Vegetius has written in detail, as said above. In this kind of dignity these men are followed by austere men like Cato, called censors, who are responsible for demanding accounts of offices, inquiring into the morals of citizens, chastising the errant, and dividing the multitude into definite classes or (if I may so say) organizing it by centuries. Akin to censors are ephors or senators, who (as the Philosopher teaches here) are the supreme magistrates with the exception of a single man, who (as he says) possesses the right of convening and calling the entire commonwealth to assembly. See, earnest reader, how Aristotle gradually proceeds from the members to the head, from the middling to the topmost and supreme. For as the planets do not shine without the sun, so the lights of the commonwealth (though they indeed be great) do not shine without the king, who has the power to assemble citizens, convene the senate, and conclude and settle controversial matters.
5. So much for the political magistracies, now follows another kind of responsibility, concerned with ceremonies and the worship of God. Why use many words? The sacred magistrates are either those who perform rites, such as priests and pontiffs, or who have a care for sacred things, like temple sextons and custodians. Among these, as among the political magistrates, Aristotle wished there to be a single supreme one, whom men variously called the prince, praetor, king of sacred affairs, or prytanis. Him the Jews and Romans called the pontifex maximus or high priest, but, as I think, we call him the Archbishop, whose responsibility is to convene the sacred assembly and to consult and decide with others of his order about doubtful issues. In their hearts two things must shine, justice and wisdom. From their mouth truth must well up and flow, like a stream from a fountain. But good God, where are priests nowadays, where are sacred things? We are corrupted by love, by fear, by profit, we speak that which is pleasant, we prop our elbows on the pillows of sinners. But the wise man (such as Vergil’s Muse depicted) should be dauntless and brave, dare to preach the good and the true, and to weigh the madnesses of the human vices, though bodies be tortured in the Sicilian bull and the sword hang over men’s necks. For the truly wise man does not shudder at the empty perils of death, so he has established his life with a fixed limit. The master, threatening words do not frighten the just man, but he publishes Christ’s laws with heart undaunted. These, these are the duties of God’s ministers, these things they should do, in these pursuits they should be wakeful days and nights. Either allegorically with Nathan, or boldly with Elisha and John the Baptist they should denounce their sins to David, to Ahab, to Herod. For they are called trumpets, watchdogs, stars, the salt of the earth, the watchmen of Jerusalem, angels, prophets, legates, apostles, pastors, doctors, bishops of souls. What are they not called that is holy, that is sacred, that is lofty? But what is a trumpet that does not blow, what is a dog that does not bark, what is a star that does not shine, what it is the salt of the earth if it has no savor?
6. I shall not speak of the other magistrates, since there is nobody who does not divine the mysteries of their titles. I say only this: if the gentiles, if the philosophers, nay if the barbarians value their priests (or rather their superstitious magistrates) so highly, how greatly should we Christians value and revere the genuine ministers of God? If those men (as the Philosopher says) nourish their priests at the common hearth and homestead of the commonwealth, why do we flatly deny our altars tithes and pious offerings? Alas, you mortal hearts sunk in the profound deep, I ask you to seek the way of salvation. We should honor God’s ministers, God’s oracles, God’s churches with our goods, our honor, our worship. For the way of salvation is to honor Christ and Christ’s emissaries and ministers. If this be lacking, men’s prudence will rush quickly and headlong into folly, their counsel into rashness, their polity into anarchy, the entire commonwealth into confusion and ruin. Asia, Africa, and the greater part of the world are lamentable examples of this thing. Oh the lamentable condition of so many commonwealths! But so far Christ’s wings are beating, so far we must listen to that voice, Oh Jerusalem, Jerusalem, how often I have wanted to gather you together, like a hen her chicks! Christ, make it so we do not hear it. But you have refused.
7. Now, omitting these things, I come to what follows in the text, which are two, namely an exposition of the things which the magistrates mentioned are concerned, and an enumeration of those magistracies which are said to be less necessary. The exposition is this. He says that necessary magistrates are concerned about divine matters, about martial matters, about revenues and expenses, accounts, morals and the demanding of accounts from those who have demitted office. The enumeration is not obscure, for only a few less necessary or common magistrates are itemized, and their only concern is that the commonwealth be deemed elegant and ornate. To this, says the Philosopher, pertain the disciplining of women, the custody of the laws, the education of boys, the headship of gymnasia, and the management of recreation, and any other offices of this sort established in the commonwealth. Those who supervise the disciplining of women can rightly be called protectors and moderators of (so to speak) matronly decency and moderation in food and dress. For this sex adores the peacock’s tail, and seeks after excess in feathers and ornaments, if they are not ready at hand. I am aiming for brevity, otherwise I should speak freely of false hair on the head, monstrous ruffs on the neck, vain lockets at the throat, silken shoes and stockings on the foot, and of the other prodigious colorations of our times, but I put a finger over my lips lest such a meek, mild creature should wax angry at me. There are other magistrates of this order, the wardens of the law, the instructors of youth, the presidents of gymnasia, the masters of games. But I think the reader should be referred to Book I of the Pandects of the civil law, or rather to the little book which Fenestella wrote about the Roman magistracies. Now I come to the delineation of Plato’s ideal state and More’s utopia (or, if you want, his eutopia), for Aristotle’s following Book VII devises a certain divine form of the republic, which to this day no multitude of men has encountered.

THE DISTINCTION OF THE QUESTION

OBJECTIONS TO THE QUESTION

8. OBJECTION There are more kinds of magistrates which are not enumerated by the Philosopher here, therefore this division is inaccurate. The antecedent is proven, since treasurers, chancellors, secretaries, masters of the horse, chamberlains, and many other magistrates of this kind are not listed in this catalogue, as is clear in the text.
RESPONSE The philosopher recites them all generally, but does not enumerate them individually. But these which you allege can be reduced and recalled to those ones, as treasurers to the quaestorship, chancellors to the office of judge, and so forth about the others. Furthermore, it is not the Philosopher’s purpose to deal with the magistracies of individual nations and races, but only to define those positions which are requisite for the common and mixed constitution of the republic.
OBJECTION Certain commonwealths are so small that they cannot admit of more than one magistrate, as is agreed about those presided over by a single praetor or petty king, therefore a plurality of magistrates are not required in any commonwealth at all, as the Philosopher teaches here.
RESPONSE Rome demands many magistracies, Mantua but one. Yet it is to be noted that that here the word “commonwealth” is taken generally for the whole republic and government, not strictly for one city. But in a republic a number of magistracies are required of necessity, and these must be distinct in their species: a number, lest confusion arise, distinct, lest in the order and imitation of nature be destroyed in civil administration. For just as in nature there is a single Prime Mover and many moving causes subordinate to it, so in the commonwealth there is a single supreme governor of all, under whom live other magistrates. And as in the natural body the parts exist according to the motion and office of their distinct species, so in civil government they differ according to the nature of their magistracy. But just as each and every one of the former tend to a single good, namely the preservation of the body, so each and all of these also tend to the common good of the commonwealth.

THE FIRST DOUBTFUL QUESTION
Are masters of games to be permitted in the well-regulated commonwealth?

9. OBJECTION Inasmuch as many noteworthy things dealt with in this chapter about civil magistrates should not be passed over by me in silence, I shall raise a couple of small doubts, which I shall very briefly deal with, using arguments pro and con. The first is whether masters of games should be permitted as magistrates in the well-administrated commonwealth. It appears (as the ancients say) that the answer is no, for they who attract citizens to idleness are not to be deemed magistrates, witty fellows and masters of games attract citizens to idleness, therefore they are not to be deemed magistrates. Reason proves the major premise, since leisure destroys the commonwealth. Aristotle proves the minor in Book IV of the Ethics, where he teaches that time spent in games is vain and idle. At the end of this chapter he also says in express words that these spectacles belong to idle citizens. Furthermore, there is no virtue in them, therefore they are not to be deemed magistrates. The antecedent is proven, since virtue (as is said in Book II of the Ethics) concerns the difficult, but to play, which is the object of these magistrates, is not difficult, therefore there is no virtue in them. Finally, if it be posited that such magistrates should be permitted, actors are also to be permitted, for supervisors of spectacles are appointed to no purpose if there are no players or actors to adorn stage and theater, but those who lavish money on actors sin, therefore such magistrates are not to be created in the well-administered commonwealth.
RESPONSE If I may respond to these arguments in order, it is to be appreciated that men belong to one of two kinds, one theoretic and only devoted to the contemplation of divine things, the other political and sociable, which delights in the pleasure of human affairs. The distinction must also be made that games are of four kinds, either for their own sake, for the sake of profit, to refresh the human mind, or that certain impediments and, as it were, nonsense of human life might be removed, such as sorrows, cares, studies, weariness of affairs and work, by which men’s minds are weighed and down and wearied more than are their shoulders by heavy burdens. Therefore I now say to all of these things in general that the first kind of men ought not to attend these mortal entertainments and theaters, since, as if by a vow or profession, they have cut themselves off from human association and crowds But the other kind can, as long as it comes impelled or persuaded by the two final causes. But such magistrates are appointed so that plays may be performed decorously, and they should admit citizens, exhausted by their work, not for idleness but for the honorable refreshment of their minds. And indeed to your second argument I should reply that this is a difficult thing, in which virtue is present. To your final one I say that all stage-actors should not be called thespians, but only those who hawk and vend their spectacles and insipid comedies.

THE SECOND DOUBTFUL QUESTION
Is it expedient for the same man to hand down and execute a sentence of death?

10. OBJECTION Nobody ought to execute a sentence of death, therefore the question is without point. The antecedent is proven, since in this way hatred is kindled: the peace of the commonwealth is disturbed, murder is committed, hatred is inflamed. For, as the Philosopher says in the text, to condemn and execute a sentence of death renders all men hateful and loathsome. The peace of the commonwealth is disturbed, since from this arises fear of sedition. Murder is committed, since a man is deprived of life and reputation by a kind of force. Furthermore, it if be needful that someone execute a death sentence, nobody can do this better than he who passed it since, just as he understood the case best, so he most justly may inflict a penalty proportionate to the guilt.
RESPONSE Safer for the corrupt part to be removed from the body than for the whole to perish. Therefore I deny the antecedent, and by way of proof I say that executing a death-sentence makes men hateful, but only to hateful and bad men, nor in this way is the peace disturbed, but rather preserved. Finally, to dismember a justly condemned criminal is not murder, since by rights he forfeited the use and power of his limbs in the commission of his crime, he who did not refer this power to his rightful end and to the good of the commonwealth. To the final part of the argument I respond that a sentence is to be considered in two ways, either in a civil cause, in which the same man may condemn and perform the execution, or in what they call a criminal cause, in which both will not pertain to the same man because of the double odium which ensues.

THE THIRD DOUBTFUL QUESTION
Should magistrates be created in the commonwealth for the disciplining of intemperate women?

11. OBJECTION It suffices to correct the effeminization and deformity of manners and dress by severe laws, and this by the agency of a single magistrate of the commonwealth: there is therefore no need to appoint several for this business, since a single man can sustain not only this, but also many another burden and duty of the republic.
RESPONSE The antecedent proposition is weak and wholly to be denied, for there has always been such immodesty of dress and manners that it is no strange thing if in this context the Philosopher should require a separate and distinct magistrate for the disciplining of women, and, at least in my opinion, were he alive in this century he would demand not one but a hundred. For, not to mention the whores and their foam-filled brothels that one finds everywhere (which have most shamefully cropped up thanks to the absence of this discipline and magistrate), I cannot keep silence of the vanity in their dress, countenances, and magpie voices. For what means this hair braided like German barbarians, what means these laces and necklaces at their throats, what means these cadaver-shrouds glittering with gold and gems? Oh the manners of men! Oh our corrupt, dark times! Nobody thinks it wrong to wear pleated garments. But pray attend, you most fair and tender nymphs. What did her precious dress profit Cleopatra? What did her golden adornment profit Jezabel? Did not an asp infect the teats of the former, did not black dogs devour the guts of the latter? Pray attend, what are you other than pretty dunghills that belong to the worms? You must die, and in the grave this beauty will become a stench and a noxious putrescence. This attraction of yours is deceiving and like a fleeting shadow, only virtue’s beauty endures forever.

PRAISE BE TO GOD ALONE

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