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BOOK I

Preface

Is education more powerful than learning?

EST human life, confronted with countless reefs of evils, should lack helps, the ancient philosophers seriously and earnestly urged that particular concern should be had for education. For education is the first, second, and third part of life, without which knowledge (as Seneca tells us) is like armed injustice. So, just as a building collapses if a firm foundation is not laid, so moral canons and precepts are discussed in vain if the principle of education is not learned thoroughly. Wisely indeed Horace said “Now imbibe words with a pure heart, by, now submit yourself to your betters. A jug will long keep the fragrance of the wine it held back when it was new.” Therefore, lest young men carry this book about morals about in their pocket like an antidote, or like fire stored in flint, lest they do a bad job of accommodating its precepts, like wholesome balms, to their mind’s wounds, lest (as they say) they rashly and thoughtlessly lay hands such a chaste science with unwashed hands, I have thought I should make my beginning from this foundation and seedbed of morals, namely from education. Thus forewarned, young men will perhaps beware lest they cast wanton eyes on Diana and be ripped asunder by Actaeon’s savage hounds, that is, lest being a-boil with passions (with which that age usually abounds) they be defiled by the stains of the vices. For just as food does one no good if his belly is full of poison, so moral precepts are not profitable if the mind is overwhelmed by vice. He who strives to possess a pleasant and fruitful garden must first uproot the stinking toxic weeds, and so he who strives to imbue his mind with the principles of moral philosophy must first dose his corrupted nature with hellebore, whereby the nooks and crannies of his mind might be purged of the contagion of a dissolute life. But this cannot occur by learning alone, inasmuch as many men are excellently schooled, but few live excellent lives. Caesar was learned, but a tyrant; Alexander was learned, but arrogant: therefore learning is not so strong but that education is stronger. The former pervades the mind, the latter molds it; the former is often discussed to no point, the latter is never possessed without profit; the former begets destruction for many, the latter always provides its adherents with salvation; the former ebbs and flows, the latter is constant and remains stable; the former flourishes in good and bad alike, the latter only shines in the virtues’ sons; the former lapses with one’s life, like a shadow, after death the latter is borne with us to heaven; the former only adorns the mind, the latter subjects body and mind to the government of virtue; contempt of the former makes one a fool, neglect of the latter renders one deadly. So it is possible that I may rightly conclude that education is more powerful than learning. The young student is therefore to be exhorted to suppress his passions, bridle his lust, rip out vices by the root, shun ignorance, heed his parents and preceptors, learn their precepts, and strive to imitate the examples set by good men. For the power of education lies in this alone, that by hearing good things you strive to live well.

EDUCATION: IN WHAT IT CONSISTS

Education is either:

Natural, which is that of the infant both regarding the health of his whole body and in the diligent preservation of harmony in his individual parts.



Civic, which is either:

Public, by the schoolteacher.
Private, by the father or the tutor, which is properly understood here.

Education has more power for the pursuit of virtue, because of:

The dignity of the subject: for will is subject to education, intellect to learning.
The excellence of the object: for education has respect to the good, but understanding to the true.
The nobility of the end: for education teaches us to live well and happily, but learning only teaches us to understand and to philosophize.


2. OBJECTION If no direction is given to morals, education has no power, direction of morals only occurs through learning.

RESPONSE

Direction of morals occurs in two ways, either through:

Learning, which only imparts the precepts of virtue.
Discipline, which urges observation of preceptors and action. The former is helpful as a remote cause, but this brings to perfection, like medicine; the former makes us understand the means of living, but the latter ingrains the habit itself. Therefore education, which conforms the mind to the activity of virtue, is more powerful than learning, which only instructs Man in the contemplation of virtue.

 

OBJECTION Whatever drives out the diseases of the mind and heals Man is most powerful for the pursuit of virtue. As Aristotle tells us, moral philosophy drives diseases out the diseases of the mind and heals Man, since it is the mind’s medicine and a purgative for the vices. Therefore it is most powerful for the pursuit of virtue, and in consequence more so than is education.
RESPONSE Medicine is one thing, the medicine’s application is another. It must be admitted that moral philosophy indeed is a medicine, and a purgative for the vices, but not without application, which is education. For learning about morals is a wholesome medicine, but education is the conforming of human life to virtue’s norm.
3. OBJECTION The older a good is, the better it is. Instruction in good morals is an older good than education. It is better, and hence has more power for the pursuit of virtue. The major premise is Aristotle’s in Book III of the Topics. The minor is proven, since there can be no conforming to the norm of virtue unless this is preceded by the understanding of virtue. For you attempt in vain to educate well, unless you can show the path of virtue.
RESPONSE These things of Aristotle are especially to be understood concerning things of the same species and genus, possessing no other difference than duration and certainty. Inasmuch, therefore, as learning and education are not goods of the same species and genus, since the former is a mental good and the latter a moral one, in these matters the argument taken from that passage does not hold.
OPPOSITION The more certain something is, the better it is. Learning is more certain than education, since it only pertains to things that cannot be otherwise than they are. Therefore it is also better, and hence is more powerful than education, which is mutable and voluntary. The major premise belongs to Aristotle, Topics III.i. The minor is in Book I of the same writers Analytics.

RESPONSE

Something can be said to be more certain in two ways, with respect either to:

The demonstration of facts, and thus learning is called the surest of all things in the first book of the Analytics.
The molding of morals, and thus virtue is said to be more certain and constant than all learning in Book I, chapter vi of the Ethics. I respond likewise concerning education, which depends on virtue alone.

 

Chapter i

Do all things have an appetite for the good?

NASMUCH as no other thing entices Man to live well and happily than the sure hope and expectation of the end (for inherent in us there is a certain ardent thirst for seeking knowledge and acquiring the good), Aristotle does excellently in making his work begin with the aim and end of human life, the keener to incite us to our duty and the easier to attract us to virtue’s harbor. For thus he says: every art, every teaching, every pursuit and deliberate action is referred to some good: by art, work seems to me to be meant; by knowledge, contemplation; by pursuit and deliberate action, activity.
2. For since human life is threefold in its kind, consisting first in work (whence we are called mechanical), second in activity (whence we are called political) and third in contemplation (whence we are called theoretic and wise), the Philosopher has appositely touched upon these three, with which he subsequently deals copiously and specifically. But, that I stray no farther from my subject, I cannot fail to mention a commonly held opinion, namely that under these three headings are to be understood everything that exists in the universe, whence arises this question, whether all things tend and are moved to the good by the force and impulse of nature. Even if I admit that what they say is true, that all things seek a good or an end, nevertheless I believe that by these words Aristotle understood a hypothesis rather than a thesis, human life rather than a tabula rasa of all things. But inasmuch as under the name of Man are customarily understood all things subjected to his government, and inasmuch as here the summum bonum is defined by the Philosopher as that which all things seek, the interpretation can rightly flow from thesis to hypothesis, that is, from a confused question to a certain and definite one. So all things have an appetite for the good: by “all” you should understand the whole of being, by “appetite” the force and power of nature, by “good” a good and an end. More distinctly, if you wish, in this way: by “all” I show that he means the four orders and ranks of things; by “appetite,” now nature itself, now nature’s power, now the influence of heaven; by “good,” sometimes a work, sometimes an activity, and often contemplation. The things in the first rank are inanimate (such as the sky and the elements); in the second are animate things (such as plants); in the third are things that participate in sensation (such as beasts); and in the fourth are things endowed with reason (like men and intellects). Once upon a time philosophers contemplating this ladder, as it were, perceived and taught that God exists, in Whom by a certain wonderful manner and association are united the essences of all things and are preserved forever, as if in an infinite, supreme good. Now, just as these four ranks are posited, so a fourfold appetite is distinguished, which are commonly called natural, vegetable, sensible and rational: in the first, things of the first rank (like the elements) are referred to their good and their end; in the second, things of the second (like plants and so forth); in the third, things of the third; in the fourth, things of the fourth. I say to their good and their end, since good and end are convertible terms: for the end is that for the sake of which the other things occur; as it is the last thing acquired, it is always the first thing proposed. According to this, the end is first in intention and last in execution. The usefulness of this disputation is that in every activity and every enterprise we heed that advice of Bias, “have respect for the end.”

3. Appetite is distinguished as above:

One kind of goods is natural:

Internal, such as as form (e. g. soul).
External, such as activity (e. g. knowledge).


Another is moral:

Per se, which is:

 

Or accidental, which is either:

A means, such as virtue,
Final, such as happiness,

A good of fortune, such as wealth.
A bodily good, such as health and a fit composition of one’s parts.

OBJECTION Those who know that what they have an appetite for is evil, have an appetite for evil. In their incontinence they know that what they have an appetite for is an evil. Therefore incontinent men do not have an appetite for the good. The major premise is clear from Aristotle in Book V, chapter ix, where he proves that nobody harms himself, since all men adjudge injury to be an evil. The minor is established in Book VII, where this distinction is drawn between wrath and incontinence, that the wrathful men fails to see what is better because of the impulse of his passion, but the incontinent or soft man sees the better, but follows the worse.

RESPONSE

 

In the soft or incontinent man, two things should be considered:

The habit of reason, by which he naturally sees that which he abandons.
The impulse of passion, violently incited by which he seeks the worst. Thus, as they say, he sees the good as if through a lattice, but kindled by pleasure’s touches he accepts the good in place of the bad. By habit of reason, therefore, he sees what is good, but has an appetite for that which is evil, and because of passion’s blind impulse does so as if it were a summum bonum. The same is to be said of those who lay violent hands upon themselves.

 

4. OBJECTION Whatever has an appetite for its good has an appetite for its end, for good and end are convertible terms. Will seeks no end, therefore it seeks no good. The minor premise is clear, since will which possesses appetite is infinite, but the happiness which is sought is finite. But between finite and infinite there is no proportion, therefore will seeks no good.

RESPONSE

Will is considered in two ways ether,:

In the essence of its perfection, and thus it is infinite and has God as its end, from Whom it has both existence and good existence.
In the rule of virtue and reason, and thus in this life it is bounded by happiness.

OBJECTION Appetite occurs because of defects in some hoped-for, desired good. There are many things which know no defect in the good, such as God and the Blessed Spirits. Therefore all things do not have an appetite for the good. The major premise is the Philosopher’s in Book I of the Physics. The minor is his in Book I of De Coelo, chapter nine.
5. TWOFOLD RESPONSE In that place natural appetite is understood, which exist in imperfect things tending towards the summum bonum, but here the word “appetite” is accepted generally not only for a movement towards perfection, but also for an essence and influence moving and preserving all things. Other men think the summum bonum to be excepted from this proposition, as in many universal statements in Aristotle’s works. For example, every body has location except the primum mobile ; whatever is known is known through causes except the First Being; every relative has a correlative except the Highest Kind. Likewise all things have an appetite for the good except the summum bonum. Both answers are probable, but the former appears better.
OBJECTION Will can or cannot display appetite, since, according to the Philosopher, it is the free will of the mind, therefore all things do not of necessity have an appetite for the good.
RESPONSE As the power of shining attends the sun, so the power of displaying appetite attends the will, and albeit, according to the Philosopher, it is not compelled to this or that by a fatal necessity, it nevertheless is not at rest, but by force of nature is always being moved towards some object.

Chapter ii

Is their a single end of actions?

OVING from thesis to hypothesis, Aristotle strives to circumscribe the human appetite by certain considerations that serve to delineate it. For in this passage he attempts to place before our eyes one ultimate end of human affairs, so that enticed both by the pursuit of the virtues and the reward of happiness we might hasten towards the goal of life, which is blessedness itself: by the things to be done, he most of all means the virtues; by a single end, he means blessedness alone which, regarding as a target, craving as a prize, we might make straighter headway and be carried the quicker to the longed-for harbor. For just as a journey sooner completed when the road is known, so when this end is perceived by the lights of the mind life is far better directed towards the summum bonum. Nobody paints aright if there is no model; nobody shoots an arrow straight if he does not see his target; nobody lives chastely if he hopes for no reward. For human life is slack and slothful, so there is need for rewards that it may be moved, there is need of goads to urge it on. Advisedly, therefore, Aristotle proposes to us a final goal, as a moving cause for living well, and if we ignore it all appetite would be idle, all our consideration of good morals would be in vain, all our choice of the best things would be without point, all future earnest activity would be silly, all the suffering of such perils in this life for only virtue’s sake would be insane. For why should these all occur? Why should they be undertaken, if there were no reward of virtue, which is blessedness? Most rightly, therefore, one end for activities is set forth, so that this prize may be gained by any man running life’s racecourse. For just as in the Olympic games he alone gains the crown who competes and wins, so he alone earns the olive-branch of virtue, which is honor, who masters all his passions. With the Philosopher, I shall conclude that this end is the noblest of all, and hence this is the noblest art to which it is subjected. But since I have adduced this argument in the epistle To the Reader, in this context I shall most cheerfully omit it.

Things to be done are twofold:

Absolutely and per se, such as the virtues alone, which by their power pertain to the acquisition of the ultimate good.
Respective and comparative, which are either:

 

 

 

Natural (such as eating and drinking, sleeping and waking), for the preservation of nature.
Useful and accidental, such as the acquisition of things needful for food and dress, which accidentally pertain to the acquisition of the ultimate good.

A single end is understood either:

Ethically, as the simple and perpetual activity of virtue, which is sought for in this life per se, and it is thus in this context.
Metaphysically, and this either:

 

 

As the eternal contemplation of the virtues, as in Book X of the Ethics.
As the infinite union of all things in the first cause, as in Books XI and XIII of the Metaphysics.

The arguments by which they prove that the end is one are drawn from:

 

The comparison with the archer looking at his target.
The consequent event, as is proven above in the supposition.


2. OBJECTION The ultimate end is said to be the contemplation of virtue in Book X of the Ethics, the contemplation of the First Cause in Book XI of the Metaphysics, and the perpetual activity of virtue in the present passage. Therefore there are several ultimate ends.
RESPONSE As the active and passive, speculative and practical intellect differ from each other in respect but not nature, so active and speculative happiness are distinguished by their manner but not in fact, for both remain in the habit of virtue and the endowment of the mind, as far as their essence goes. Wherefore, even if the manner and the existence of both is changed regarding subject, likewise the habit and essence of both is immutable and persists. But concerning the metaphysical end, I reply that this is not understood here, for here we are dealing with the conjoined end, not the separate one.
OBJECTION The end of a single branch of knowledge is not the end of all things to be done, blessedness is the end of a single branch of knowledge, namely the civic (as the Philosopher teaches in this context), and therefore it is not the end of all things.
RESPONSE Albeit there are particular ends for all things and branches of knowledge (such as right speech in Grammar, ornate speech in Rhetoric, subtle speech in Dialectic), yet there can be a single ultimate end of all things, to which the rest are referred, just as the lines of a circle are referred to its center. But that this ultimate end is referred to this branch of knowledge distinctively and exclusively comes about because of this science’s dignity and excellence, since, just as the other branches of learning are subsumed in Metaphysics regarding genus and order, in Dialectics regarding the consideration of probability, so they are subsumed in Ethics regarding the genus and ordering of the good.
3. OBJECTION Evil is the opposite of good. Therefore, just as there is a supreme good, so there will be a supreme evil, and hence there will be two ends.
RESPONSE Evil is the opposite of good, and, just as there is a single good, so there is infinite evil, as Pythagoras taught. Nonetheless evil cannot be an end, but rather it is a privation of the end. For it is the office of the end to perfect, but evil’s end is to corrupt and create a deprivation of all perfection.
OBJECTION Man is no less born for knowing the truth than for doing the good, Therefore, just as the summum bonum is the end of doing things with respect to the will, so the supreme truth will be the end of knowing things with respect to the intellect. The first part of the antecedent is proven out of Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book X, chapter x.
RESPONSE Just as the will is metaphysically referred to the infinitely, simply and immutably good, so the intellect is referred to the infinitely, simply, and immutably true, since the true and the good are the same First Principle, cause and mover of all things, namely God Himself, Who is defined by Aristotle as the First Mover, single, simple, infinite, immense, immutably enduring without time, Who can change all things, but Himself cannot be changed. Here we are not dealing with this end.
OBJECTION Aristotle deals with the objects of both will and intelligence, namely of the good and the true, in Books I and VI of the Ethics, therefore we are dealing with this double end.
RESPONSE In the passages you cite Aristotle indeed is dealing with the objects of both will and intellect, but in another sense. Here he deals with them as they pertain to political life and usage, but there as they are essentially united in God; here how they can be acquired in this life, there how they can be apprehended under eternity. For in Book III, chapter v of De Anima Aristotle posits that will and mind are eternal and immortal, whence out of necessity it follows that the object of both must be eternal, lest no proportion exist between subject and object.

Chapter iii

Does demonstration exist in this science?
Is a youth a fit student?

N this chapter two things are explained by the Philosopher, the ordering of the art and the student of the art, so that, now the end has been understood, the road of progress man not be doubtful and uncertain: the student, lest such a science be vainly handled or learned by rote by any old person. He prescribes an easy ordering: it is that of a discipline, inasmuch as the dissimilarity of men’s manners in various places, the multitude of things and customs, the great uncertainty of outcomes upon which in this life men often depend, men’s frailty and error, and finally the variety of human activities which, as Aristotle says in the text, cannot be bound by the certain law of demonstration, forbid an accurate and refined manner of disputation in this branch of philosophy. But mark you, albeit there is no demonstration for these causes, as there is in Mathematics, a sure and effective method of persuasion is possible, now from example, now from induction, now from outcomes and other such things. For in Ethics we do not seek to instruct the intellect so much as to move the will. For intellect is overcome by demonstration, will by induction. And now, the ordering perceived, I shall say who is a suitable and fit student. Many men indeed study this, but very few study it well and effectively. For in this context “study” does not mean only to hear words with one’s ears, but also to meditate more deeply upon virtue’s precepts, and so to excel in word, life, and example. Thus the beardless youth is excluded from this school, the dizzy old man not admitted: for the former has not learned experience, the latter is suffering a second childhood, driven by his passions as if by the Furies. Hence that proverb is right, “an old man is twice a boy,” not only because he is deficient in strength, life and intelligence, but also because, set in Charon’s barque, he is no good student of moral philosophy. Here, therefore, “youth” should not be understood in terms of age, but of manners. For just as constancy is rarely discerned before the conclusion of this period of life, so a tethering and moderation of the passions does not always attend upon a hoary head. Wherefore in this context I define youth not in terms of fewness or manyness of years, but of inconstancy and levity of manners, for, if I may truly say what I think, it was not the Philosopher’s blanket decision to hiss out and debar from this gymnasium any man younger than thirty-five, the concluding age of youth. Nevertheless, in my judgment, this was his sentiment, he urged nothing less. For within the circle of so many years a man can suppress his passions, acquire experience, perfect his intellect, and get a correct grip on the government of reason and virtue. If I am not mistaken, this opinion is to exclude youth, that is, any man who fails to overcome himself, that is, to say it once more, who yields overmuch to his passions, who is a slave and chattel to the vices. Wisely that man said “He is strongest who overcomes himself rather than the strongest things.”
2. So let the youth study it, let the old man study it too: let the latter study it as a medicine, let the former study it as the rule of life. For it is useful for good and bad alike: for the good, that they may always pursue virtue, for the bad that they may at length rebound from extreme unhappiness.

There can be no demonstration in this science, because of:

The dissimilarity of manners,
The multitude of things.
The alteration of laws.
The uncertainty of outcomes.

 

All of which are frequently change, and for this reason cannot be explained accurately by demonstration.

The impediments that keep a man from being a fit student of moral philosophy are:

1. A defect of age.
2. A perversity of opinion.
3. An ignorance of things.
4. An inconstancy of manners.
5. The ebb and flow of the passions.
6. An affluence of the vices.


3. OBJECTION ABOUT THE ORDERING Every science which is concerned with a very certain matter can be confirmed by demonstrations. Moral philosophy is concerned with a very certain matter. Therefore it can be confirmed by demonstrations. The major premise is Aristotle’s in Book I of the Analytics. The minor is in Book I, chapter x of the Ethics, in which passage stand these words, namely that in no mortal thing is there such firmness, such constancy, as in those which are conducted in accordance with virtue. And again, in Book II, chapter vi the Philosopher says that virtue is surer than any science.
RESPONSE As in these contexts Aristotle speaks of the firmness and constancy of virtue, so in chapter ii of the Book these words are taken in the contrary sense: but as in wholesome things, thus in the activities which are conducive to all these things there is nothing of firmness, nothing of stability and strength. Wherefore what is to be noted is not what Aristotle said in these contexts, but what he meant. So in those former passages he had in mind the wonderful influence of virtue for strengthening habit, and thus it is more strong and certain than any art, not with respect to the definition of a thing, so it may be concluded, but with respect to the inclination and direction of the mind, so it might be strengthened in life’s honorable activities. The other passage is understood as dealing with human activities (which are uncertain).
OBJECTION That science which possesses definitions and properties can employ demonstrations. Moral philosophy possesses both definitions and properties. Therefore it can employ demonstrations. The major premise is clear, since the definition and the property are principles of demonstration. The minor is agreed, since in this science virtues, vices and passions are defined and their properties are explained.

RESPONSE

Sciences are said to be certain in three ways, either those whose:

1. Principles can in no wise be altered or impeded: thus Metaphysics, Physics and Mathematics are deemed certain.
2. Principles are indeed certain, working an effect per se, but nevertheless can be accidentally altered, as a constellation designed to produce this or that effect which can be stricken by the force of something else.
3. Principles are uncertain and often impeded in the workings of their effects, such as will, appetite, and intellect, and the analysis of their sciences cannot be a conclusive; they indeed to impart definitions and properties, but material ones (as they say) with respect to the subject in which they are present, not formal and per se with respect to the thing defined, inasmuch as virtues, vices, and passions are accidental things, and are defined and demonstrated by means of their subject.

  4. OBJECTION Young men are suitable students for speculative science, and so they are all the more suitable students for practical and moral science. The antecedent is proven, since the young man’s mind is like a tabula rasa fit to receive every form. The argument follows a maiori or a fortiori. For in Book X of the Ethics contemplation is said to be better and more certain than activity.
RESPONSE There are two particular obstacles to a young man being as suitable for the study of moral philosophy as for the contemplation of things, since moral principles depend upon experience (which youth lacks), but the principles of speculation do not; and again, since in in the young man’s soul moral philosophy discovers many things that resist and oppose it, namely passions and pleasures, but contemplation discovers nothing contrary to itself. Wherefore even if it is difficult to learn a contemplative thought, it is nevertheless most difficult to be a student of moral philosophy, that is, to follow it and observe its precepts.
OBJECTION Happiness, the end of this science can be acquired before the end of youth. Therefore a youth is a suitable student. The antecedent is proven, since the Philosopher teaches any man at all can be blessed.
RESPONSE If you look within the compass of this age, I do not deny that a blessed man can be found, but, since this age very rarely is self-consistent, this thing is denied in the text.

Chapters iv and v

Is pleasure, abundance of wealth, or virtue happiness?

T would be a tedious, or rather an endless task to review here all the views and opinions of happiness held by all the philosophers. For rightly did Aristotle say that it would be folly to heed what each has to say: Pyrrho altogether denied its existence; Porcus Aristippus thought it was pleasure; Croesus and Midas deemed wealth the summum bonum; Periander defined it as honor, Socrates as knowledge, Plato as the idea, Zeno as virtue, Dio as prudence, Bias wisdom, and our Aristotle as the employment and activity of virtue. Why waste many words? As many men as there are, so many are their heads and their ideas. For when we are infirm we dream that the goal and harbor of human life lies in health; when we are oppressed, that it is in liberty; when we are feeble, in health; when we are humble, in honors. So some opinions about happiness out of the throng and forest of those held by the foremost philosophers are refuted in this passage, of which the first is that pleasure should be deemed the summum bonum, the second that honor should be, the third that wealth should be, and the fourth that virtue should be. What ought I to say about the first? This is the saying of a cow, not a man. For how could be possible for Sardanapalus, that whirlpool of all the lusts and pleasures, to turn out a happy man? For if pleasure is nothing else than the bait of the Serpent, the hemlock of virtue, the foam and seed of venery, than the sewer and (as the orator says) tediums of all baseness, if it is (to conclude with the Philosopher) a plague shared in common by us and the beasts, how can it be that it is Man’s proper end and summum bonum? So shun the pleasures. For pleasure, purchased by pain, works harm.
2. There is no need for me to employ many words in disputing about the second opinion, for albeit this age of the world is an ambitious one, nevertheless Caesar with his pomp took a fall, Alexander with his scepter. Rightly he said, “I shall reign, I am reigning, I reigned, I am sans reign.” Fortune’s ladder is slippery, and envy always attends upon rule: the higher you climb, the harder you fall. For “Icarus gave his name to the Icarian Sea.”
3. Honor, says the Philosopher, resides in the man conferring the honors, but happiness is in the happy man himself, therefore honor is not happiness. The third opinion begot ruin for Midas. For when he obtained his wish that whatever he touched would be turned to gold, at length he most wretchedly died, consumed by hunger. Many men nowadays seethe and suffer with a thirst for money, dreaming of nights of a golden Nile instead of gold and silver, which are naught but Nature’s excrement, and they are carried onto every reef. Wisely did Ovid write, “Men have entered the bowels of the earth, etc.” I deal with it thus in a single word: wealth is a good of fortune, in wealth there is no constancy, since we may use wealth badly, it creates destruction for many and danger for nearly all, therefore happiness is not in it. The fourth opinion is weighty, for it is that of the Stoics, namely that virtue is Man’s summum bonum. Indeed I know not in what scales to weigh this argument, yet I join Aristotle in saying that, Keno, who takes virtue for human happiness is a friend; Plato, who takes the idea, is a friend; but truth is more a friend, which takes the constant activity of virtue. For even though virtue be more precious than gold, even though virtue alone survives our deaths, nevertheless if you understand it as existing in habit rather than action, in peace rather than in motion, and if you keep it in your pocket rather than your hand, then assuredly, just as it does little to serve as an example for others, so it fails itself in seeking after the title of happiness. Since therefore virtue is one thing, but virtue’s activity, another, I posit the latter as the means and the former as the prize, the latter as the root and the cause, the former as the fruit and the end.

WHAT IS PLEASURE?

4. Pleasure is a natural and insidious passion of the mind, arising either from memory, presence, or anticipation of a genuine or apparent good, by which the senses are delighted, the spirits dissipated, the appetite pacified, which (as Aristotle says) is harder to resist than madness.

Pleasure is not happiness:

Since it is a natural passion.
Since it is common to Man and beast.
Because it incites us to evil more than to the good.
Because it corrupts more often than it conserves.

WHAT IS HONOR?

Honor is a due reverence granted to someone as testimony of his virtue or high dignity.

Honor is not happiness:

Because of its uncertainty, since it is a fluid good and an external one.
Because of the danger that often arises from it.
Because of its relation to another good which is sought per se.

Honor exists essentially and subjectively in the man doing the honoring, but it exists by a cause and objectively in the man honored.

WHAT IS WEALTH?

5. Wealth is an external good won by labor, preserved by fear, lost with sorrow, which can be an ornament of virtue in good men, an instrument of crime in bad.

Wealth is not happiness:

Since it ebbs and flows.
Because it befalls good men and bad.
Because it brings more men to ruin than to virtue.

WHAT IS VIRTUE?

Virtue is a voluntary and elective habit, located in mediocrity, according to the circumstances for action prescribed by the prudent man.

Virtue is not happiness:

Since its essence, namely habit, can exist in a sleeping man, i. e., in a man doing nothing, but happiness cannot be in him thus.
Since virtue is sought because of its activity, which activity is called happiness.

A GENERAL DISTINCTION BY WHICH IT IS SHOWN THAT EXTERNAL GOODS ARE NOT HAPPINESS

It is proven that external goods cannot be happiness:

By reason of possession, since they cannot be said to be properly ours.
By reason of acquisition, since they are not always acquired by just means; for often they are gotten by force and fraud.
By reason of dependency, since they are always referred to other things.
By reason of insufficiency, since appetite is not stopped by them, in accordance with that saying “love of gain increases along with money.”

  6. OBJECTION Every good which is sought for its own sake and not for the sake of something else. Pleasure is such. Therefore it is a summum bonum. The major premise is Aristotle’s in the text. The minor is in chapter viii of Book I of the Rhetoric.

RESPONSE

In Man, two things are considered:

Reason or intellect, and thus it is directed towards the activity of virtue, which is true happiness.
Passion or appetite, and thus it is often swept along to pleasure, which is called the highest good among the passions of which Aristotle is treating there.

 OBJECTION That which possesses the most delight and for which all men have an appetite is the summum bonum. Pleasure possesses the most delight, and each and every man has an appetite for it. It is therefore the summum bonum. The first part of the major premise is Aristotle’s in Book I, chapter x, where he teaches that happiness is a most delightful and pleasant thing. The second part is in his definition of the ultimate end. The first part of the minor premise is proven, since nothing is more delightful than pleasure, which is essentially delight. The second part is agreed, since sages, dunces, and men of all conditions thirst after pleasure.
RESPONSE Pleasure is not essentially delight, but the cause of delight, which is regarded by the wise man, not as the end, but as a concomitant good. For there is an efficient good of happiness (such as virtue), a helping good (such as fortune), a concomitant good (such as pleasure), a good that puts an end to appetite (such as happiness itself, which alone is sought for its own sake and in its own right).
7. OBJECTION Honor is the end of civic life, as is said in this fifth chapter. Therefore it is happiness.
RESPONSE In this text, the “end” is understood as the reward.
OBJECTION Every property is contained within its subject. Honor is the property of the happy man. Therefore it is inherent in the happy man, and hence what is said in the text is false, namely that honor exists in the man conferring the honor, not in the happy man. The major premise is a rule of Dialectic. The minor is in Book I, chapter xi of the Ethics.

RESPONSE

Honor is understood in two ways, with respect to either:

External applause, and thus it is in the man conferring the honor.
The internal affection of the happy man, and thus it is in the man receiving the honor.

 OBJECTION That which, in accordance with its essence, cannot be altered or obstructed seems to be happiness more than that which cannot. With respect to its essence, cannot be altered or obstructed, whereas virtue’s activity can be. Therefore virtue appears to be happiness more than does virtue’s activity. The major premise is agreed, since happiness should be a perpetual, constant and unalterable good. The minor is proven, since, even though virtue is altered with respect to its activity and its existence, with regard to its habit and essence it still cannot be altered, and thus the Philosopher is understood in Book II of the Ethics, where he teaches that, as far as we go, virtue is a means.

RESPONSE

The twofold action of virtue:

Transient, which can be altered and obstructed if you remove its objects, which it employs as its means, and such activity is not happiness.
Immanent, which is the firm, perfect and inalterable intention or plan of acting well, and such cannot be obstructed or altered.

8. OBJECTION A good which suffices per se is happiness. Virtue is a good which suffices per se. Therefore it is happiness. The major premise is Aristotle’s in Book I of the Ethics. The minor is agreed at chapter 7, Book II, where it is said that virtue is sought for its own sake, and that it perfects Man. For whatever by itself confers perfection appears to be sufficient.
RESPONSE When Aristotle says virtue perfects Man and makes him excellent, he means virtue present in action, not habit. But virtue’s action is twofold: either external by means of the object, or internal by means of counsel, patience and suchlike, which always declare a man to be happy, even if no external work should follow.
OBJECTION Nothing is better than the good, as the Philosopher declares in Book III of the Topics. Virtue is a good. Therefore nothing is better than virtue, and in consequence happiness is no better good.
RESPONSE Boethius answers that nothing is better than the perfect good so far as essence goes, yet regarding existence something can be better than the good. Wherefore even if he concedes that happiness is not an essential good better than virtue, yet contingently it is better, since it does more to perfect its subject. If you press the point that happiness is also an essential good, I indeed admit this regarding the genus of the good, but not in relation to its subject. For as accidental things virtue and happiness have respect to the subject.

Chapter vi

Is truth preferable to authority and friendship?
Is Plato’s idea happiness?

RUTH is plain and simple, but effective and great: it shines when darkened, it prevails when oppressed. Hence, just as the Romans once built a temple of Peace in the midst of their city, so the Egyptians once revered statues of Truth in their cities. For the name of peace is always lofty, and the divinity of truth is always divine. So though Plato be our friend, though Socrates be our friend, yet the truth should be a greater friend for each and every one of us. As he says here, compelled by its power Aristotle rejects and refutes his teacher Plato disputing about ideas and abstract forms of things. For, just as friendship without virtue is justly scorned, so no less is authority without truthfulness. Taking advantage of this opinion, here certain interpreters ask, not inappropriately, whether truth is always to be preferred to authority and friendship. It is one thing to deal with the issue raised, and another to treat the opinion of Plato’s being refuted. Wherefore, reader, grant me your pardon, if now I digress a little from my subject and my purpose. For I do this so you may have my opinion concerning Aristotle in his refuting and philosophizing, and I shall briefly deal with this by refuting Camillo, whom I deem the of all men in philosophizing. I say in refuting Camillo, since with kicks of envy he attacks those men from whose teats he has suckled philosophy’s nectar; I say he is the chief of all men in philosophizing, since he has so expounded nature’s secrets that nobody can demonstrate them more acutely, nobody more precisely, and nobody has defended them more stoutly. Wherefore, just as in his refutations of others he is scarce welcome, so in his demonstrations of things I urge him to be embraced (as they say) with both arms like no other. Unless I am wrong to censure him, if he should refute or alter a word, or twist a meaning, or invent a new one, and carry on as if he were Hercules fighting a Pygmy, so (that I may conclude this business) Aristotle is fighting with a shadow over goat’s wool: you may, for example, perceive that what I am saying is quite true if you read and diligently compare Book I of De Anima, Book I of the Metaphysics, and Book II of the Politics. For in these he bares his fangs and bites others, and from the ruins of the older philosophers, as if from out of the flames, he seeks to snatch his triumph before gaining the victory. Very egregious and “worthy of the charcoal” is this example which he uses against his tutor Plato, whom in this passage he makes out to be a squawking parrot (the only thing he hopes to accomplish). For where did Plato teach that happiness is in idea, as if it were fluttering about in the air, hovering in the mind, or floating about in eternity? It is crystal-clear where he taught that there is a double idea, the one being conjunct, which he called the contemplation of the First Cause, the other separate and metaphysical, which he called the First Cause and Divine Mind. He defined the one as happiness in this life, and the other as happiness in eternity. With this opinion set forth (which, surer than sure, is Plato’s), to what point does Aristotle molest it with so many words, as if it were deadly? To what point does he dispute about an accidental without a subject? To what point does he debate whether an idea is a universal or an individual? Whether it is insubstantial or accidental? Whether it is eternal or transitory? Whether it is conjunct or separate? He who snatches at a fly hunts in vain. I hear many words and arguments which do not strike Plato, against whom he insinuated he was going to speak.
2. But I leave off these things and return to the first question, regarding which who doubts (unless he be imprudent and negligent) that the truth is to be placed before friendship and authority? For truthfulness is called a good per se, but friendship and authority are said to be accidental goods. For whether you understand friendship because of the delightful, or because of the useful, or because of the honorable, assuredly friends reap no fruit from intercourse with friends if their minds are not bound together by the link and bond of truthfulness. For true friendship is broken when a friend is cheated by deceit. Furthermore, authority depends on one or two men’s government and life, and is often conjoined with passions, but truth is everlasting and unmoved by any perturbations of the mind. Finally, friendship and authority pertain to few men, but truth to everybody. For no man may lie, no man may deceive others. Rightly Seneca said, “all men should have the truth in tongue, mind, and hand.”

Truth is to be placed before friendship and authority, because of:

The dignity of the subject: for truth resides in the intellect, but friendship and authority in appetite
The eternity of the source: for truth derives only from God, but friendship and authority often depend on human will.
The stability and constancy of good: for truth is a virtue per se, whereas friendship and authority are such by accident.
The excellence of the means: for truth directs the mind to happiness by contemplation of the First Cause, which is simple and eternal truthfulness, but friendship and authority do not supply this.
The community and simplicity of nature: for truth both pertains to all men and is free of all passions, but friendship and authority neither to pertain to all men nor lack all passion.

Happiness is twofold:

Divine, and either:

Abstract and infinite, which Plato calls the first idea and cause of all things.
Conjunct and subjective, which he placed in us in accordance with the idea and beholding of the first idea; he thought the one could be acquired in eternity, and the other in our mortal condition.

Human, and either:

Active, which Aristotle treated in Book I.
Contemplate, which he treated in Book X.

 

3. OBJECTION Whatever engenders hatred is to esteemed less than that which makes all men join together in the pursuit of virtue: truth engenders hatred, but friendship binds men together in the pursuit of virtue. Therefore hatred is to be esteemed less than friendship. The major premise is Aristotle’s in the Magna Moralia, the minor depends on a familiar proverb.
RESPONSE Hatred is no result of the truth, but of evil and corrupt Man, whose ulcers, touched by the lance of the truth, break out afresh. Wherefore, even if fawning creates friends, but the truth hatred, the truth is nonetheless not to be esteemed less than fawning, since that evil comes about not by the activity of truth, but by Man’s corruption.
OBJECTION Whatever more preserves the republic is more to be preferred. Friendship preserves the republic more than does truth, and so is to be preferred to truth. The major is obvious to everybody. The minor is proven out of Book VIII of the Ethics, where it is taught that legislators are more preoccupied with friendship than justice, since the commonwealth is more preserved by it. If friendship is assuredly to be preferred to justice, the queen of all the virtues, it is much more preferable to truth, which is deemed to be inferior to justice by many degrees. To this can be added arguments from the testimony of Cicero, who in his book De Amicitia teaches that this is to be preferred to all human things, and also that “a friend is a second self.” Every man is bound to prefer and preserve himself most of all, therefore he is bound to defend friendship more than truth.
RESPONSE It is to be denied that the republic is more preserved by friendship than by truth. For the bond of friends harmonizing in their pursuit of virtue is truth itself. Therefore a friend will not calmly allow a friend to err, to be misled, to be deceived. Where the Philosopher says that legislators are more preoccupied with friendship than with truth, he means natural rather than civil justice. Arguments based on Cicero’s testimony have more of a store of eloquence than a coherence of reason. Or, if this is more to your liking, I respond thus, that friendship is to be preferred to all human things, i. e., to all fluid and transient things, and also that every man is bound to prefer and preserve himself most of all under a condition of virtue. For nobody is permitted to act basely and shamefully, even if confronted with the most exquisite tortures and torments, as Aristotle attests in Ethics I.iii.
4. OBJECTION Authority has altered the time for observing the Sabbath, authority has also altered the time and the mans of receiving the Lord’s Supper. Therefore it seems to be placed ahead of truth, which ordained otherwise.
RESPONSE An argument from a secondary consideration (as they say) to a simple one does not follow. Doctors respond to the examples adduced that ceremonies and circumstances, such as time, ordering and place, can be altered by authority, but that things themselves and their substances cannot. Or does authority fight against truth in these things, since the truth shines forth, not in the time which is altered, but the thing itself which is observed. Furthermore those holy mysteries of our salvation, namely Easter and Pentecost, which fall upon Sundays, have most obviously implied an alteration of the Sabbath.
OBJECTION Good is the summum bonum, as Aristotle teaches at De Caelo I.ix and also in Book XI of the Metaphysics. By the infinite and separate idea Plato means nothing else than God. Therefore in this passage he is unjustly rebuked by Aristotle.
RESPONSE I concede this and its consequence. Nevertheless, if by the idea Plato had meant political happiness, as Aristotle says he did, then undoubtedly his refutation would not have been unjust.

Chapter vii

Is happiness a sufficient good?
What is happiness, and what is the happy man?

HE ancient philosophers’ errors refuted, Aristotle returns to his discourse on the summum bonum, and asks whether happiness is a sufficient good. Mark you, earnest reader, this discussion is about political and human good, not theoretic and divine. For God is single, infinite, simple, eternal, and (to use the interpreters’ word) an all-sufficient good, Who, remaining unchangeable outside of time, can alter all things although He Himself cannot be altered, from Whom (to conclude with the Philosopher) all things in nature possess their being and well-being. Since, therefore, in this passage, Aristotle calls happiness the most perfect and divine of all goods, he is to be understood as speaking only of those goods which are possessed or can be possessed thanks to the pursuit of virtue within the circuit and running-course of this life. For in this passage and circuit of mortal life what more precious gem than virtue, what more glorious reward than happiness exists or can be imagined? For wealth flees. For “thirsty Tantalus snatches at the streams fleeing from his lips.” Strength grows old, for “an old man is twice a boy.” Beauty withers like a leaf, “for the ancient wrinkle will come.” Life will not be enduring, for we are born dying. So what fixed condition, what repose, what target and harbor of life is there, if not happiness alone? Rightly Mantuan wrote “It is honor, when the ship has come from the sea into harbor, for the journey you started with praise to be continued.”
2. So if happiness is that end which is sought for its own sake, so much so that it is referred to nothing else in this life more rich in its fruit or greater in its dignity, it is clear that it is rightly called supreme in its order, sufficient in its perfection, and that which is absolutely good in this life. Furthermore, since this is a good content with itself, since the other goods of this life gather together in it, since it is not stricken by any blows or thunderbolts of adverse fortune, since by this good alone the appetite of reason and thirst of the will are sated, nobody will rightly criticize us for calling it perfect and sufficient in all its numbers. Furthermore, inasmuch as in this good there exists perpetual peace without commotion, supreme delight without disturbance, notable constancy without lightness, divine honor without misery, we may rightly designate it as the best goal of life and the final and sufficient good of human actions. Hence is defined the constant activity of the mind in perfected life: by “mind” the Philosopher means the intellect and the will, by “activity” the movement of virtue, by this word “constant” consistency in action, by “life” perfected life; in persevering he means the anchor of patience and prudence, as if he were to say “happiness is an activity, i. e., it is immanent in the subject in accordance with its essence, but transient in its object in accordance with its existence; it belongs to the mind, i. e., to human intellect and will; it is perpetual, i. e., perfected by the usage of reason; it is perfected in life, i. e., guided and steered in accordance with the rule of reason and virtue. I say it is an immanent activity with regard to its essence, since if you consider its nature, it is located only within internal goods. I also add that it is transient with regard to its existence, since if you consider its use, it is perceived in external goods. It is interpreted as an activity of the mind (i. e., of both reason and will): of the intellect with respect to reason; of the will with respect to potential and freedom.” That this interpretation is very much in agreement with Aristotle’s reasoning and authority is established from the Philosopher’s words in chapter viii of this Book, where he concludes the goods of the mind alone are necessary for happiness, but requires the other goods as ornaments, and in chapter x, where he teaches that, if you take away external goods, happiness is indeed weakened, but not removed and destroyed: for he says that the happy man most shines forth when he suffers the greatest woes and tragedies of misfortune. At the foot of this chapter the happy man is also defined as a foursquare man, watchful, as it were, in the citadel of virtue, constant and wise: watchful lest he serve as an example of carelessness to others; constant, lest he serve as an example of levity; wise, lest he serve as an example of rashness. Why waste many words? The happy man is the man perfected in morals, who seriously ponders how he may live justly and die aright.

In the text, happiness is proven by Aristotle to be a sufficient good:

By the imperfection of other ends, which are referred to happiness as to their goal.
By the distinction of the good per se, such as happiness, from the accidental good, such is a good of nature or fortune.
By its continuity, since it is perpetual and unalterable.
By the perfection and peace which the blessed man enjoys thanks to it.
By its remuneration, since honor is doe to happiness, and praise to virtue

 

A sufficient good is either:

Absolute, divine and unalterable, and thus God is called the only sufficient good.
Comparative or human, which is most perfect with respect to all the goods in this life, and thus happiness is a sufficient good for the reasons I have just now stated.

Happiness is either:

Divine, which is defined above.


Human, which is:

Simple and:

Active, which is defined here.
Contemplative, which is treated in Book X.

Collective, which belongs to the commonwealth rather than a single man, and this is handled in the Politics.


3. OBJECTION In the text the Philosopher requires that happiness suffice not just for the happy man, but also for his parents, children, wife, friends and fellow citizens. It is impossible that the good of one man can satisfy so many. Therefore happiness is not a sufficient good, as Aristotle requires.
RESPONSE The Philosopher is to be understood as speaking of transient activity, in which the happy man should not be failing to his people, if he has the ability. But if there be no object which he might treat generously, he is called no less happy in his essence. For the happy man depends on virtue, not fortune. From the former he possesses his habit, from the latter his ornamentation.
OBJECTION For happiness, Aristotle requires both external and internal goods, therefore the one is not sufficient without the others.
RESPONSE He requires external goods, not for the essence, but for the existence and ornament, as I have said.
OBJECTION If external goods are not required by necessity for the happiness with which we are dealing, then there is no difference between active and contemplative happiness. But the Philosopher attests that there is some difference. Therefore they are required.
RESPONSE Your major premise is false. For it is not required that the man endowed with active happiness always be in action, but only that he might act with decorum if the occasion be given him. Likewise it is not required that a man endowed with contemplative happiness can act, since in accordance with his office he lives a solitary life in contemplation alone. Others answer that there is no difference between active and contemplative happiness with respect to their essence.
OBJECTION Virtue’s activity is laborious, therefore it is not a sufficient good. The antecedent is proven in Book II of the Ethics, where the Philosopher teaches it is laborious to find the mean, and very difficult to be a student of virtue. The argument follows, for if activity is laborious, it will also be troublesome, and in consequence happiness will not be a sufficient good.
RESPONSE It is indeed laborious to find the mean, but by far the fairest thing for the man who finds it, with the result that nothing can be more delightful than virtue’s activity. Virtue’s root is most delightful fruit, as Isocrates taught.
OBJECTION The soul is the good, happiness is sought for the soul’s sake, therefore happiness is sought for the sake of the good, hence for the sake of an end. If this is conceded, it does not appear to be a sufficient good. The major premise is Aristotle’s in Book I of the Metaphysics, where he teaches that it is good and one in all things. The minor is confirmed in Book X of the Ethics, where he teaches that happiness is sought for the soul’s sake.
RESPONSE The understanding of the good is being changed. For the the soul is called the good according to its existence, derived from God, but happiness is defined as an extrinsically perfecting good, not as a constituting good. Indeed happiness is sought for the soul’s sake, not that it might possess the soul’s end and object, but that it might ornament it, its home and its object.

OPPOSITIONS AGAINST THE DEFINITION OF HAPPINESS

4. Work and operation differ in the same way as do house and house-building. In the text happiness is called a work of Man, therefore it is ill-defined as an activity or an operation.
RESPONSE Just as oratory is called by rhetoricians the orator’s work and instrument (a work, because it is created and constructed by the orator, an instrument because he employs it in every case for the sake of accomplishment), so philosophers call happiness both a work and an operation: a work, since it is created and acquired by many activities, an operation in since it is maintained by perpetual good activity.
OBJECTION Virtue’s activity is intermittent. For often we eat, play and sleep, and therefore happiness is not rightly defined as a perpetual activity. This argument appears confirmed by the Philosopher in this Book, where he teaches that we do not differ from the wretched during the half of our lives.
RESPONSE In just the way that an accidental property is said to be in something, not because it is always inherent, but because it always can inhere, so happiness his defined as a perpetual activity, not because the happy man is always in action, but because he can and wants to act when granted the opportunity. The happy man eats, plays, and sleeps, for he is a man, but yet he is not for this reason called less happy, since his mind is constantly and well engaged in these things. So just as the sun always exerts its influence, even if it is sometimes obscured from our sight by cloud, so the happy mind is in perpetual activity, even if the body is overwhelmed by sleep. Therefore it is to be said that happy men do not differ from wretched during the half of their lives, not because they are not happy, but because they are not adjudged to differ in the opinion of the multitude, which (since it is ignorant) imagines that the habit and immanent action of virtue is wholly extinguished and destroyed in sleep.
OBJECTION The activity of the intellect only tends towards the true, the activity of the will towards the good. Therefore happiness, which is the only good, is ill-defined as the activity of both.
RESPONSE The activity of these two is defined in diverse respects, as you can see above.
OBJECTION Life’s ending is uncertain, as the Philosopher says in the text. Therefore there is no perfect life.
RESPONSE Life’s ending is doubtful and uncertain: if it is not steered by the perpetual pursuit of virtue, I concede that this life is exposed to countless reefs of miseries. But just as nothing happenstance befalls the wise man, so nothing miserable afflicts the happy. For, just as a good cobbler makes an excellent shoe out of bad leather, so the happy men leads an excellent life made out of the evil results of things. For he tolerates the bad so he can might enjoy the good.

Chapter viii

Are three kinds of good required for happiness?

HREE kinds of good are distinguished by the philosophers: those of the body, the mind, and fortune: of the body, such as strength; of the mind, such as the virtues; of fortune, such as wealth. Now the question is whether happiness consists of these three kinds of good. Very strange it is how certain interpreters are impelled to this view, that they should dream that in this passage Aristotle was teaching these three kinds of good are necessarily required for the essence of happiness, especially when it is clearer than daylight he never entertained this thought in his mind. For these are his words: “Since the good is divided into three kinds, and some goods are of fortune, others of the mind, and others of the body, I call the goods of the mind the most true and greatest goods.” And again in Book X he has these words: “It is clear, if we pursue the events of fortune, we will call the same man now happy, now unhappy, so we will affirm that a man who is thus happy is like a chameleon, nor sufficiently sound.” And a little while later, “Adversity weakens a happy life, but does not destroy it.” Finally: “It would be most criminal to ascribe to fortune the greatest and most important thing of all.” It would be infinite and tedious to adduce all the passages and opinions (scattered throughout his works), which most plainly convince us that the goods of nature and fortune are not required for the essence of happiness. Nature is fragile, fortune is fickle and inconstant. If they be present, they may ornament us; if they be absent, they are not required of necessity. Milo was destroyed by his arm, Caesar by his ambition, both trusted fortune over-much. It’s an old saying, “good fortune is never enduring.”
2. But out of Aristotle you will urge that nobody who experiences Priam’s calamities in dying is happy, even if in his entire previous life he has lived as the happiest of all men. I join Aristotle in replying that this is true, if he does not nobleheartedly bear those calamities which befall him, if he does not turn the evils of fortune and nature to virtue’s use, which is to say, if he yields to his passions, if in the height of his misfortune he casts away the shield of patience and despairs. To this should be referred all the passages that appear at odds with this interpretation, especially that one at the end of chapter viii, the words of which are “Nor is that man at all fit for happiness who is entirely deformed, or ignoble, or who lives his life alone, or is childless (or, much worse, whose children are depraved), or whose good friends have departed this life.” If you compare this passage with another in chapter ix, you will readily understand it: the words there are “Of the other goods, some are necessary” (he means the goods of the mind), “some are helping and like instruments” (he means those of the body and of fortune). In this matter I perhaps seem overly wordy and tedious, but I have done so for the purpose of showing that those interpreters are most vainly blind, or more likely insane, who have dared maintain Aristotle’s happiness is nonexistent and never appears in nature. How can it be possible, they say, that all goods of mind, body and fortune can be combined in a single feeble man? I respond that this is not possible, or at least is scarcely so. But what then? Therefore he cannot be happy? You are wholly mistaken, Aristotle did not demonstrate such. For he argued that happiness is an essence which is located in a constancy of the goods of the mind, not in an affluence of transitory things. Wealth, friends, children do not make a man happy. The error of nature, disease and deformity do not define the unhappy man. Men are identified as happy thanks only to virtue, as wretched thanks to vice alone.

THE DISTINCTION OF GOODS

Goods have respect to happiness concerning either:

Essence, and thus only the goods of the mind are required.
Existence and ornament, and thus the goods of the body and of fortune are required.

3. OBJECTION Fortune does not exist, therefore there are no goods of fortune. The antecedent is proven by the Philosopher in the Physics, where he teaches that fortune is contrary to nature, and by Augustine in his book Retractations, where he teaches it is contrary to Providence.

RESPONSE

Fortune is understood either:

As the blind mistress of human affairs whom the poets portrayed as a goddess, and it is impious to posit it thus.
As an uncertain, unknown and accidental cause of events, and this is spoken of, not with respect to God’s prescience of all things, but with respect to Man’s ignorance. Hence the statement in the Ethics that where there is more ignorance, there there is more fortune. Wherefore, even if all things are certain with respect to nature and necessity, still, many things occur that are contingent and happenstance with respect to our ignorance and blindness, and such they are here called the goods of fortune.

OBJECTION Those things are necessary to happiness without which, when they are taken away, happiness does not exist. Such are certain goods of nature, such as human form, life and health. Therefore the goods of nature are required of necessity. The major premise is proven from the definition of necessity. The minor is agreed in Book II of the Physics, where it is taught that nature seeks its form as its end, and in consequence as its good. Concerning life and health, nobody doubts these are goods of nature. If, therefore, human form is a good of nature, and if you take away the form Man does not exist, it follows that if the form is removed, then so is happiness.
4. RESPONSE As in the tract De Relatis being a man is said to be a certain adventitious quality of being a master and a slave, although without the man neither the master nor the slave can exist, so soul and human form are said to be a certain adventitious quality of happiness, even if happiness cannot exist without the soul. For just as man does not belong to the essence of a relationship, so the soul does not belong to the essence of happiness. Therefore it is one thing to belong to essence in a principle, but another to belong to essence in a subject. The principle of happiness is virtue, in which it is preserved. The subject of happiness is the mind, in which it is comprehended. Concerning health and life, I respond that they help happiness if they be present, but that they do not destroy it if they be absent, since happiness exists in the mind, which is eternal.
OBJECTION As is proven in Book II of the Ethics, there is no activity of virtue without an object, but happiness is an activity of virtue, therefore it does not lack its object. If all this is conceded, I argue as follows: the objects of the virtues are goods either of nature or of fortune, therefore the goods of fortune or nature are required of necessity.
RESPONSE To your major premise I respond that sometimes there is an immanent activity of virtue, which is, as it were, a reflexive action upon itself. But let it be granted that there are objects of the individual moral virtues in which their activities are occupied, it is nonetheless wrongly inferred that the goods of nature and fortune are required of necessity, inasmuch as just as there is a twofold activity of virtue (immanent and transient), so there is a twofold object: internal, which perfects the immanent one, and external, which perfects the transient one. An example of the internal is counsel with respect to the wise man, and example of the internal is danger with respect to the brave man. Thus the one which tempers us internally has respect to pleasure, the one which does so externally has respect to food and drink.

Chapter ix

Is happiness a gift of God?

HE noblest good derives from the noblest cause, otherwise there would be no proportion of dignity between cause and effect. Heaven’s motion is simple and eternal. Why so? Since the Primum Mobile is deemed to be simple and eternal. Hence Aristotle said “if anything is given to men by God, it is most appropriate for happiness to be given.” If you ask the reason, he replies that it is better and more excellent than human affairs. I would be tedious if I were to attempt to strive to gather out of Aristotle’s various works and place here all his statements in support of this view. I refer the reader to Book X of the Ethics and Book XII of the Metaphysics, in which it appears that the summum bonum and supreme truth are going to be taken for the infinite and eternal principles thereof, but Aristotle says that these subjects do not belong to the present time and disputations, as if he were to say “I do not deny that happiness is a gift of God, but this context demands that I incite the more slothful to the pursuit of virtue, lest, while they think that it is only granted by God, they grow old in leisure without care, in vice without their lives bearing fruit.” Nobody is born an artist and nobody is happy against his will, and yet the arts derive from God, as does happiness. Do you want me to explain everything in a word? It is a crime to ascribe happiness to chance, it is criminal to grant this to human powers. But here I require earnestness, I require industry. For as in the Olympic games the crown is not bestowed on the handsomest or the strongest, but on those who enter into the competition, so they do not participate in happiness who do not spend their days and nights bent over virtue’s oars. It’s an old saying, “He who has not tasted of the bitter has not deserved the sweet.”
2. Another old saw is “God does not love the idle.” Wherefore, to conclude everything with a few words, happiness is set before Man as a prize, but is not acquired without Man’s industry. He is unworthy of the boon that has been given him who does not reach out to the giver. Rightly indeed is he unhappy who does not busily and diligently seek after this God-given gift. This detracts nothing from His divine majesty, which wishes that we love and not be ingrates, which bids that we act and not be idlers. So, just as medicine works no cure if the patient does not take it, so this gift profits nothing if a man refuses it when given. For nobody is compelled to lead a happy life: one is drawn to it, perhaps, but nobody is compelled. For we speak of someone being drawn by rewards, but not of him being compelled by goads.

God’s gift is given either:

Absolutely and without a means, such as creation ex nihilo and the gifts of the Divine Spirit, which Aristotle does not mean.
Respectively, with a means and a condition, and thus happiness is given by God to men who earnestly pursue virtue, not to idlers: for its acquisition are required method, time, will, industry, and nature; therefore Aristotle does not deny this good is divinely granted, but he also means that it is acquired by earnest endeavor, by means of industry.

3. OBJECTION Whatever belongs to the category of things that occur rarely and from an extraneous source has as its cause fortune itself, as is proven by the definition of fortune in Book II of the Physics. Human happiness belongs to the category of things that occur rarely and also from an extraneous source. Therefore it has fortune as its cause, which contradicts Aristotle in the text.
RESPONSE Albeit happiness occurs rarely, and so is an accident for its subject, yet it does not derive from fortune, for it is intended by its operator as an end, not a chance effect. For example, a man tilling the earth sometimes comes across a snake: his intention is to till the earth, not to come across the snake.
OBJECTION In the text happiness is called something most divine, therefore it is granted Man by God alone.
RESPONSE It is called most divine not absolutely, as it exists in God, but in part effectively, as it flows from God, and in part objectively, since by its means Man is most assimilated to God.
OBJECTION Man’s soul is the proximate, single and immediate gift of God. For, as the Philosopher attests, it comes from heaven and is not produced from the potential of matter. Therefore happiness, which is its perfection, seems to come only from God. The argument follows, since He who grants the form grants all the consequences of the form.

RESPONSE

Some things are consequences:

Simply and by necessity, and thus He who grants the form grants all the consequences of the form.
Contingently and by chance, and thus He who grants the form (for example, the soul) does not all the consequences of the form (for example, happiness).

4. OBJECTION In God, will and ability are the same thing, as Aristotle wisely teaches. He has the ability to make a man happy in this life proximately and immediately. Therefore He also has the will. Which things being conceded, it appears impious to ascribe happiness partially to God and partially to Man. The minor premise is clear in Book VII of the Physics, where he proves that the Primum Mobile consists of infinite potential.
RESPONSE In God, will and ability are the same thing, if you consider the essence of divinity, but not if you consider the providence of His order and disposition Assuredly He can illuminate the universe without the sun, but He does not wish to; He can govern the universe without law, but He does not wish to; He can feed Man without food, but He does not wish to. In His providence it pleases Him to employ order and a means, not because He cannot act without a means, but because He would not wish to do anything without order. Wherefore I respond, although God can make a man blessed in this life proximately and immediately, if you regard His infinite ability, He does not wish to, of you consider His order and providence. It is therefore not impious to ascribe happiness to God most of all as its first principal, but next to Man as its instrument.

Chapter x

Can a man be called happy in this life?
Can a happy man be unhappy?

OLON, asked by Croesus who seemed happy, said “Tellus the Athenian seems such to me, who had very chaste daughters, who lived a long time most uprightly, who died while fighting most bravely for his homeland.” Asked for a second time if, after Tellus, he knew anyone happier than Croesus, he said yes, Cleobis and Biton, who, like Hippocrates’ twins, always loved each other and, like a team of oxen, pulled their poverty-stricken, aged and feeble mother to Juno’s temple. Then with a threatening expression on his face an angry Croesus mounted his throne, resplendent in his gold, gems and purple. Now for the third time he asked Solon if he knew anybody more blessed than Croesus, “Oh king of the Lydians,” Solon answered, “Man must always await his final day, and nobody ought to be called blessed before his death and burial.” Croesus scorned this dictum, but afterwards he was overcome by Cyrus in war and, being brought to his pyre bound in chains in the sight of the Persians, thrice he said as loud as he could “Oh Solon, Solon.” When Cyrus grew curious and asked what man or god was this Solon, Croesus said “One of the sages, whom once I most foolishly scorned when he foretold this catastrophe, being arrogant and prideful in my prosperity.” Hearing this, Cyrus not only freed Croesus, but always kept him at his side in the greatest honor. Thus with a single saying the wise man seems to have preserved one king and rendered the other more prudent.
2. But why say these things? So that you will understand that along this road we travel to the grave there are many stumbles, in this light we enjoy for a time there are thick shadows. But, mark you, just as there is the greatest vicissitude in the outcomes of things, so in the effects of the virtues there is no deviation and inconstancy. So Solon was right, and so was Aristotle: for just as the former spoke of the misery of this life, so the latter did about virtue’s anchor. If you consider the goods of fortune, there are a thousand mishaps, but if you weigh the goods of the mind, there is one fixed target of Man’s life. And yet, as Aquinas says, Aristotle choose to play with Solon and to turn his dictum (as he as just done with Plato’s) into a shadow against which to fight For Solon did not deny virtue its constancy: he commended the fortitude of Tellus, the piety of Cleobis and Biton, but he wisely gave Croesus a warning when he was perilously exulting amidst a sea of riches. But, these things aside, I say that a man can be called blessed in this life.
3. In these Books I always mean political happiness, not theoretic. For if a man could not be called happy in this life, tell me, would not all effort and appetite in this life of ours be pointless? Again, would not the writing of laws for the making of happy citizens be idle? And would not the use of the word “happiness” be silly, since there would be nothing to answer to the name? Then too, would not Man’s condition be wretched, if the ship on which his born, tossed by so many and so great waves, were to have no anchor of virtue, no harbor? Finally, does virtue have no magnet, no power which attracts Man to itself? Does no man live chastely, soberly, earnestly? Are we all like chameleons? Why should be a prize be set before us, if no man takes it? Why is virtue praised, if nobody craves it? Why is blessedness taught, if no man lives wisely? I admit that Venus has moles on her face. I admit that passions exist in the mind of the happy man. I admit that the blessed man is striken by fortune’s darts, is afflicted by diseases, is wounded by many extremities of evil. Yet he does not weaken, indeed this is when he most shines and triumphs. Therefore rightly does Aristotle conclude in this chapter that the happy man cannot be unhappy. For the unhappy man is without intelligence, abject of mind, full of sin, but the happy man is wise, brave, always striving after virtue, so as always to put fortune to rout; not to mention that the blessed man can always overcome her storms, since he is always wise and has calmly endured what chance has offered. For if they are good and fortunate, they make his life more pleasant; if they are bitter and unpleasant, they make him far more blessed: as a suppressed flame shoots up, so the mind of a blessed man transcends all miseries.

In this life, a man it to be called happy because of:

The steadfastness of his virtue, upon which he depends.
The perpetuity of his activity, in which he employs virtue’s objects.
The constancy of his right reason, by which his life is steered.
The excellence of his mind, which, strengthened by many activities of virtue, is not corrupted with ease.


An unhappy man is understood in three ways, either:

As a poor and moneyless man, and thus it sometimes befalls a blessed man to be called unhappy.
As a man of abject mind, and thus he cannot be unhappy.
As a man enslaved to crime, which signification is proper to unhappiness, and thus the happy man cannot be unhappy.

  4. OBJECTION There’s no man alive whose ending is certain, therefore in this life no man is to be called happy.
RESPONSE As I have often said, the gallows and the rack do not wound the blessed man. For here I am not setting forth Man’s Fall, but his state of happiness. It is one thing to be a man, another to be a blessed man. Man’s ending is indeed uncertain, but the ending of the happy man, who perseveres in virtue’s perpetual activity, is not uncertain.
OBJECTION As Seneca says, this life is misery. But in misery no man is to be called happy. Therefore in this life no man is to be called happy. The major premise is proven by reason, since this life is a movement of the mind towards vice and of the body towards the grave.
RESPONSE This is no true definition
of life. For it is unhappy, but it is not unhappiness itself; it is not a movement of the mind towards vice and of the body towards the grave, yet is perilous and, as it were, covered and buried with the filth of many crimes. These things are said of external considerations which, as I have just shown, do not wound the blessed man.
OBJECTION A happy man can be said to be not happy, as Aristotle says in the text. Therefore it appears he is capable of being unhappy. For “not happy” is a negation of the contradiction, which has no mean.
RESPONSE A man can be said not to be happy, not because he is not, but because when favorable conditions are removed appears to be such.
OBJECTION No affection is so steadfast and firm in its subject that it cannot be corrupted. Happiness is an affection, and therefore can be corrupted. Which being conceded, it will follow that the happy man can be unhappy, for if you take away his unhappiness he will be unhappy.

RESPONSE

In happiness are considered:

Its accidental essence, and thus it can be removed from its subject.
The constancy of its activity, habit and customary state, and thus it cannot.

Chapter xi

Do the affairs of their survivors pertain to the dead?

EST someone think that Aristotle has not yet satisfied Solon, another subject is now handled, in which Solon’s opinion is partially refuted and partially upheld: he is refuted when Aristotle proves one can be happy in this life, he is upheld when he demonstrates the most blessed life of the dead. Sufficient has now been said about the first part, a few things occur that must be said about the second. In the preceding chapter the Philosopher speaks thus: “It is assuredly silly to imagine that the affairs of their progeny do not pertain to their parents, not at any time.” In this chapter he speaks as follows: “The idea that the calamities and misfortunes of their descendants and all their friends do not at all pertain to the dead should be very incompatible with the duty of a friend, and should appear repugnant to the ideas of all men.” From these words, in my opinion, are evident the immortality of the mind and the blessedness of the departed. There are indeed six hundred places in Aristotle which prove immortality, and a great many that prove this happiness. The mind is eternal and immortal, so he teaches in his Books on the mind; human happiness is perpetual, so he teaches in Book X of the Ethics. It is therefore strange to me why it entered the head of Velcurio (otherwise an interpreter not to be argued with) to deny that it can be proved out of Aristotle that the mind is eternal. “But you haven’t touched the quick of the thing,” perhaps you say, “for the question is whether the affairs of their descendants pertain to the dead, in which question the issue is not the immortality of the soul, but rather the means by which this pertaining occurs.” I for my part admit that what you say is true, but first I should demonstrate the immortality and blessedness of the dead, before proving that our affairs concern them. So with these things posited, in the preceding chapter Aristotle proves the means and order of this pertaining. This is his view, that it is possible in the case of a man who has lived out a blessed life until old age and has migrated out of this life in conformity with this manner of living that many changes will attend him in the afterlife. Yet it is absurd that he who is died should also be changed and should be now unhappy, now blessed. From which words is taken this meaning, that the affairs of their descendants pertain to the dead, but in such a way that their descendants’ dignity makes them no more blessed, nor their calamity makes them any more unhappy. In this chapter he has the same, for he says “Therefore this is indeed evident that the ups and downs of their friends pertain to those who have died, but in such a way that it does not transform them from blessed to unhappy or anything else of the sort.” For after this life there is no alteration of blessedness in the soul.
2. Should you desire to understand more about this matter, I urge you to read that fragment about the dream of Cicero, that you carefully go through the book De Mundo, the tenth Book of the Ethics, and the final three of the Metaphysics, from which you will learn much about the eternity of the mind, the dignity of the sensible and blessed spirits, much about the majesty of the Primum Mobile, and much about the contemplation of all things in their First Cause. And if these are intelligently compared, the sources at which I am only pointing would undoubtedly throw much light upon this question. Philosophers teach that for all eternity the separated, happy soul beholds the Primum Mobile, i. e., God. They teach that after its separation it does not cease to love because it lacks union with the body. They teach that, being liberated from its cares, it has a far more divine understanding than before. Why should this be, pray, if the affairs of their progeny do not pertain to the dead? I shall not bring onto the tragic stage Scipio speaking about the Roman Empire, Patroclus talking of his burial. These are fictions and tales. But I raise this question, whether the mind thus separated is more wise so that it can understand nothing. Or thus understanding that it cannot be wise? Does it thus behold the First Cause that it cannot know or think at all on past things? I acknowledge that the soul, separated from the body, is indeed finite and limited in its essence. What then? Do you therefore conclude it is ignorant? It is one thing to know by means of the habit of its nature and of its essence, it is another to know by means of the reflection and influence of the First Cause. Here, earnest reader, I am making no definitions at all, but I am gathering these moral precepts, so that Achilles should build a tomb for his Patroclus, that sons of good fathers should walk in their footsteps, that those who come afterwards should imitate the examples of the blessed.

In the text is proven that the affairs of their descendants pertain to the dead:

By the office of friendship, for it would be harsh and incompatible with this duty to teach the contrary.
From the testimony and opinion of all those who have always adjudged they are pertinent.

3. OBJECTION In the text Aristotle appears to express doubt whether the dead are happy at all, therefore he concludes confusedly and indistinctly that the affairs of their descendants pertain to the dead. The antecedent is proven by these words, “Concerning the dead, it is to be asked whether they participate in some good or not.” For from his words it is evident that, even if something either good or bad pertains to them, it will be slight.
RESPONSE He has no doubt about the eternity or blessedness of the dead, but in this passage he shows that the ups or downs of their posterity does not at all alter the condition of the blessed, and so he asks whether they have any share of somebody’s good or evil, as if he were to say “I raise the question whether the dead have a share of our goods or evils.” He replies that is impossible that these can make blessed the dead who were not such before, or snatch the happy life from those who were previously blessed.
OBJECTION If the affairs of their descendants should pertain to the dead, then it is probable that the dead retain a memory of, and concern for, their descendants. But this is untrue. Therefore the affairs of their descendants do not pertain to the dead. The major premise is taken from a sufficient division. The minor is proven by reason, since memory is a power of the sensitive mind, which is extinguished along with our life, for the separated soul will be freed from the care of mortal affairs (as the Philosopher attests). Otherwise it does not appear to be simply happy and unchangeable.
RESPONSE The first part of this argument (about the manner of knowing) is resolved at the end of my argument. For the separated soul has understanding by the influence of the Primum Mobile, not by its memory, which is extinguished. And it is said to have a care for its progeny, not because it is ever disturbed from its condition of happiness by their vicissitudes, but because, as if placed and situated in a citadel, it can observe the ups and downs of its posterity. So why does it observe, perhaps you ask? So that when you have understood this (namely, that it observes) you may imitate its previous life.

Chapter xii

Is happiness an honorable good more than a praiseworthy one?

O we might be all the more incited to the acquisition of virtue (about which the Philosopher has now said much), now an honorable prize is held up for all those about to undertake this journey, namely distinguished honor. For the Philosopher concludes that this is a good more to be worshipped with divine eulogies than to be attended with human praises, since we are praised for some affection or virtue when we are just, when we are brave, when we are good men. But the prize of happiness ought to be greater and more excellent. For it is that good than which none better, none sweeter, none more honorable can be acquired in the course of this life. Yet in this passage Aristotle deemed it wrong and sinful to assign and ascribe those honors to the happy man which are consecrated to God, who is infinite and immeasurable. For to what mortal do we ever say “Whatever Phlegethon possesses, whatever the earth's hollow bowels, whatever is within the sea, whatever cleaves the air with its wings, You have created, and You alone govern this work.” So God is not praiseworthy like Man, but is more than honorable since He is related to no cause, but is per se most supreme and most divine. So in the text Aristotle goes on to teach that moderate praise is the proper quality of virtue. Virtue is a lesser good than praise. Virtue is therefore celebrated with praise, happiness with honor.
2. Finally, Eudoxus accorded the highest honor to pleasure, which he thought to be the summum bonum. What then? Are we to award a lesser palm to happiness, which we seek by virtue alone? Why waste many words? In this good exists the the highest repose, the highest perfection, the highest splendor. Thus by rights the highest honor is owed to the best thing, I say to the best thing. When I say the highest, I do not mean the empty clamor of the multitude, the loud clapping of the flatterer. There is such a thing as fickle honor and such a thing as constant honor; there is honor in the noise of the man conferring the honor, there is honor in the very bosom of the happy man. So just as virtue is always praiseworthy even if nobody praises it, so the happy man is always venerable even if nobody gives him honor. For here we are not asking what is given, but what should be.

Honor is either:

Divine, which consists of fear and love, and this is owed to God alone, whom we should adore for Himself alone, and all else for His sake.

Human, which is either:

External, in the fickleness of Fortune and the multitude, and this is not always a reward for happiness.
Internal, in the firmness of virtue, which is in the happy man and does not depend on the applause of the people, and this is the happy man’s reward.

3. OBJECTION Every greater good contains within itself a lesser good, as the Philosopher attests. Honor is a greater good than praise. Therefore honor contains praise, and hence, if happiness is an honorable good, it will also be praiseworthy.
RESPONSE When Aristotle says happiness is more worthy of honor than praise, in my judgment he does not exclude praise, but inasmuch as praise has less brilliance than honor, he bestows praise upon virtue in one rank of honor, and honor upon happiness in another. So, since virtue and happiness are related things, so praise and honor are not diverse. For honor is naught else but intensified praise.
OBJECTION We should give honor to God, our sovereign and our father. Therefore it not owed to the happy man alone.

RESPONSE

Divine honor is owed to God alone, as stated above; but human honor is distinguished into either:

Servile, owed to one’s master because of fear.
Natural, owed to ones father because of nature’s impulse.
Civil, owed to the sovereign because of his just government, and to the happy man because it is the reward of virtue.

4. OBJECTION The sovereign is always blessed. Therefore the same honor is not owed to the sovereign and the happy man.
RESPONSE In the sovereign three persons are considered: that of the man, of the commonwealth, and of God. Albeit as a man he is not always revered with the same honor as is the happy man, nevertheless as he represents the person of the commonwealth or of God, he is deemed worth of the same veneration. For in a king it is not the viciousness of his mind, but the majesty of his office that should be taken into consideration. Wherefore those who take up arms against either a good or a bad prince act feloniously, since they strive with might and main to do violence to his sanctity and at the same time to destroy the dignity of the republic.
OBJECTION Honor is the object of one virtue, namely modesty, and therefore is not the reward of happiness. The antecedent is Aristotle’s in Book IV. The argument is clear, since happiness extends wider than a single virtue.
RESPONSE Not only modesty, but also magnanimity and justice are accorded honors. Yet it is conceded that its proper object is modesty, which is rightly defined as ambition’s bridle. So I reply to the argument that external honor is the object of modesty, but internal honor is the reward of happiness.

Chapter xiii

Is an understanding of the soul germane to the moral philosopher?
Is appetite the subject of the moral virtues?
Are the dreams of good men better than those of bad men?

HUS far we have dealt with the happiness and the reward of practical life, so we, acting out the tragedy of this life, might flee from the waves to the harbor, from the impulse of nature to the government of reason, from the gales of fortune to the anchor of virtue. Then, for the most part, life is lived righteously, when the end of living well is aimed at. Now Aristotle thinks the moral philosopher’s duty is to hand down certain generic and specific precepts concerning virtue. Thus our aim is surer, our way straighter, our life better. For we seek in vain for the rewards of happiness if the means for achieving happiness itself are held in disdain. And the only means are the virtues, by which, as by clinging to the rungs of a ladder, at length we mount to the citadel of blessedness. Now the Philosopher’s intention is to deal more exactly with the virtues. But, lest he draw us into the Labyrinth without a thread, he observes due order so that a little might be understood about their subject, namely about the human mind.
2. Therefore the first conclusion of this chapter is that we must deal with virtue, since virtue alone makes men good. Second, that we must speak of the virtue of the mind, not the body, since the philosopher must be a healer of the mind rather than the body. Third, that the vegetative part of the mind is not virtue’s subject. For this is most discerned in sleep, but the good man is not distinguished by sleep from the bad. From these points it is clear that a certain understanding of the soul is germane to the moral philosopher: I say “a certain,” not the simple and absolute understanding contained in the Books on the mind, although he he should know only as much as pertains to virtue’s division. For since some of the virtues belong to the mind, and others to morals, since some of them are located in intellect and others in appetite, at minimum it is needful for him to understand those in which shines the entire power of his science. For just as the physician does not scientifically heal that part of the body which he does not understand, to the wise does not wisely treat that part of the mind of which he is ignorant. Therefore here the Philosopher distinguishes the potentials of the soul, making some common and others proper: common, as the vegetative power most visible in sleep, and the appetitive power most visible in sensation, and proper, such as the intellect (subject in its own right to the mental virtues) and will (subjected to the moral ones).
3. For, although in this chapter and in others he often calls appetite the seat and subject of virtue, nevertheless he undoubtedly means that appetite receives virtue inchoatively, and will absolutely. For in the reception of virtue appetite stands in the same relation to will as does surface to substance in the reception of an accidental quality. The virtues therefore have their beginning in appetite, but are perfected by will. For why else would the Philosopher teach that the virtues and vices are within our power? Why else would he demonstrate that the activities of both are voluntary? But, perhaps you will say, he distinguishes appetite, so that one kind of appetite is entirely devoid of will, but another is obedient to the dictate of reason. “What then? So is it acceptable to posit appetite and not will as virtue’s subject?” For my part, I admit that appetite is its subject, as I have said, but not its complete subject: for it is inharmonious and absurd that that potential of the soul should be virtue’s subject which has reason exerting influence upon it by participation, and not inherent in itself by constitution. But, in a word, I conclude that this is the case: if appetite lapses, will still endures, therefore appetite is not virtue’s subject. But do you still urge that will is a kind of appetite: therefore if will is its subject, will it be an appetite? Your warning is correct. For from this I deduce a twofold will: one being sensible, which is properly called an appetite, and another being intellective, which is called by its name of will. For indeed, as say, will is a kind of appetite, but it is located in reason rather than sense. “What then? Do not wish virtue to have respect to appetite in any way?” You are being obtuse. How often have I told you that appetite is the first and inchoate subject, but will the ultimate and perfected one? Nor do I deny that other powers of the mind, namely imagination, common perception, and memory are in a certain sense subjected to the contemplation of virtue.
4. Hence is drawn the conclusion which I treat in last place, that the dreams and imaginations of good men are superior to those of bad. For, just as we are sometimes delighted by the objects of the virtues or the vices, so at night in dreams we are often affected by the appearance of things, since when the external senses are bound shut the mind’s inward potentials are thrown open. Good men therefore dream of the things which captivate them in daytime, in sleep bad men think about the worst of things: the slave dreams about hunger, the glutton about food, Paris about Helen, Pamphilus about his Glycerium. Why so? Since the slave is gaunt, the glutton is greedy, Paris is a rascal, and Pamphilus is a lover of all women. At this point, therefore, young men need to be exhorted, as do the old men of our times, that the former not think excessively upon their Helen, and the latter not overmuch upon their money. For what we think about by day, such we imagine at night.

The soul must be understood by the moral philosopher, so that these things may be understood:

Virtue’s subject, which is either the appetite inchoatively or the will perfectively.
Virtue’s object, which is either true or good, both of which exist in the mind.
Virtue’s eternity, which depends on the eternity of the mind, as is said in Book X of the Ethics.
Virtue’s perfection and end, which is to favor the earnest and blessed mind.

Appetite is twofold:

Sensitive:

 

 

Intellective, which is:

Concupiscible.
Irascible.

As such, it is the subject of inchoative virtue, since the virtues begin in it.

Untrained, which is like a tabula rasa fit for the good.
Formed, which is the perfected and (as they say) ultimate subject of virtue, for in it the virtues are perfected.


The dreams of good men are superior to those of bad men, either:

Because of the deep impression made on their external senses by good objects, such as are images of the virtues before their eyes and the words of the wise always resounding in their ears.
Because of the frequent activity of good works, such as helping the needy with money and the ignorant with counsel.
Because of assiduous meditation on the best virtues which thus strengthen the soul that not even during the body’s sleep does in fail in the pursuit and contemplation of virtue.

OBJECTIONS TO THE FIRST QUESTION

5. Whatever is quite devoid of reason by its nature is not the subject of virtue, which is the norm of reason. Appetite is quite devoid of reason by its nature, as is said in the text. Therefore it is not virtue’s subject.

RESPONSE

Appetite is considered in two ways, as it resembles either:

A rebellious servant, and thus it is not at all virtue’s subject, since it is opposed to reason.
An obedient son, and thus it is virtue’s subject, but inchoatively, as I have shown.

OBJECTION Appetite is an accident, and virtue is an accident. An accident cannot exist within an accident. Therefore virtue does not exist in appetite. The major premise is agreed, since appetite is a natural potential, but virtue is a habit that exists in quality. The minor is Aristotle’s in Book II of the Topics.
RESPONSE Appetite is understood in two ways, either as it is a part of the mind, and as such it is capable of grasping the virtues and the passions, or as it is a natural potential in the first species of quality, and as such it is not. Otherwise, it is to be said that it is a “subject by which” (as they say) not a
subject which,” since, just as color is received into substance by means of surface, so virtue is received into will by means of appetite.
OBJECTION Appetite is the seat of the passions, so it is not virtue’s subject. The antecedent is clear in Book III of the Topics. The argument is proven, since passion and virtue are contraries: for virtue preserves right reason, but passion summons Man away from it.

RESPONSE

Passions are twofold:

Strong, which call us away from right reason and do not coexist with virtue.
Middling and, as it were, moderated by virtue’s government, and such ones rightly harmonize with virtue within appetite.

6. OBJECTION In sleep, says Aristotle, the good man is not discerned from the bad, therefore the dreams of good men are not superior to those of bad ones. The reasoning follows, for if the dreams of good men are superior, in this way there will some distinction between good and bad.
RESPONSE The good man is not distinguished from the bad in sleep, but is often discerned from the bad by a dream. For sleep is a binding of the senses in good and bad alike, but a dream is a kind of mental agitation which, when the external senses are bound, is sometimes meditated upon within. Wherefore even if good is not naturally distinguished from bad by sleep, yet in a certain way they appear to be discernable morally.

PRAISE BE TO GOD

Go to Book II